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The Stock Exchange as Multi-sided Platform and
the Future of the National Market System
Steven McNamara*
Since Regulation National Market System (Regulation NMS) came
into force a decade ago, computer technology has transformed the stock
markets. While Regulation NMS benefited investors by lowering stated
transaction costs, it also created today’s complex and fragmented trading
system. An increasing amount of trading now occurs off-exchange in dark
pools and other “non-lit” venues, and hidden costs proliferate. In addition
to the profits taken by high-frequency traders, these include the defensive
costs of the technological arms race, the possibility of another “Flash
Crash,” public suspicions of “rigged” stock markets, reduced allocative
efficiency, and rising proprietary data fees paid by stockbrokers and
institutional investors. In prioritizing the goal of competition, Regulation
NMS failed to take into account the stock exchange’s inherent economic
nature as a multi-sided platform and the negative effects of setting the
existing exchanges into competition with one another. Furthermore,
digital technology undermines a number of Regulation NMS’s grounding
assumptions. Given the nature of modern stock exchange as a digital
multi-sided platform, it is time to reconsider the central limit order book
(CLOB) proposals made in the 1970s through the early 2000s. An updated
proposal for a “virtual CLOB” would allow the current exchanges to
remain in existence, thereby avoiding a single monopoly exchange, while
eliminating or mitigating many of the most pressing problems of the
current system.

* Visiting Associate Professor, The University of Florida, Levin College of Law;
Associate Professor of Business Law, Olayan School of Business, The American University
of Beirut. The author may be contacted at sm99@aub.edu.lb. He wishes to thank Robert Rhee,
Danny Sokol, William Page, Seth Chertok, and conference participants at the 2017 National
Business Law Scholars Conference for helpful discussion and comments during the
preparation of the Article. Thanks also to the Levin College of Law for a summer research
grant that enabled this work.
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The Stock Exchange as Multi-sided Platform

INTRODUCTION
Corporate stocks currently trade on over fifty venues in the
United States: thirteen stock markets,1 classified as “exchanges”
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and over forty alternative trading systems (ATSs),2 which include both dark pools and
electronic communication networks (ECNs). Significant amounts of
stock also trade in the internal matching engines of large brokerdealers. The highly fragmented equity markets are relatively new,
since before 2007 the New York Stock Exchange (the NYSE)
accounted for 80% of the daily trading volume in NYSE-listed
stocks.3 Now, no one exchange has more than 15% of the trading
volume, and no exchange family more than 25%.4 The fundamental
causes of this rapid change of affairs are the implementation of
Regulation National Market System (Regulation NMS) and the
technological change of the past twenty years. Regulation NMS is a
complicated regulatory compromise that knits together the formerly separate stock exchanges into one national market system yet
preserves the independence of the individual exchanges. Under
Regulation NMS the exchanges are meant to be competing venues
for the consummation of trades.
In fact, Regulation NMS has been largely successful in accomplishing its objective of reducing stated transaction costs for
investors.5 While other factors such as technological innovation and
the decimalization of prices share credit for this development, the
Order Protection Rule of Regulation NMS does force exchanges to

1. See NYSE, Nasdaq and . . . ? Get to Know the U.S.’s Stock Exchanges, Part 1, FINRA
(Aug. 17, 2016), www.finra.org/investors/nyse-nasdaq-and-get-know-uss-stock-exchanges
-part-1.
2. See Market Structure: Volume and Liquidity Update, COWEN ATM (Jan. 23, 2017)
[hereinafter COWEN ATM], http://www.cowen.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017
-01-23-Cowen-Volume-Liquidity-Update.pdf (listing forty-three dark pools); see also GARY
SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43739, DARK POOLS IN EQUITY
TRADING: POLICY CONCERNS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 3 (2014).
3. See James J. Angel, Lawrence E. Harris & Chester S. Spatt, Equity Trading in the 21st
Century, 5 Q.J. FIN. 1, 5 (2015) (stating that the NYSE had 80% market share in its listed stocks
in 2003).
4. See John Polise, A Bridge Too Far: A Critical Analysis of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Approach to Equity Market Regulation, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 285, 332
(2017); COWEN ATM, supra note 2.
5. See Angel et al., supra note 3, at 1.
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compete with one another through protecting the best-priced quote
currently displayed on a registered exchange.
On the other hand, Regulation NMS shares much of the blame
for creating a highly fragmented marketplace. Not only is trading
dispersed among thirteen different registered exchanges but an
increasing amount occurs off-exchange in unlit, “dark” venues.
Dark trading has grown in response to the risks of trading in lit
venues, where high-frequency traders are able to exploit timing
advantages to the detriment of slower traders. The fragmented
marketplace drives another cost, the need for traders to purchase
in-depth, proprietary market data from the exchanges that goes
beyond what is required to be made publicly available by the securities information processor (the SIP). Rising data fees are paid not
only by high-frequency traders but by institutional investors and
stockbrokers who feel they need to have such data in order to
remain competitive and meet their legal duties to clients. Finally,
the rise of high-frequency trading (HFT) in the context of fragmented markets contributes to the risk of market crashes, as was
experienced in the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010. In sum, while
stated transaction costs have diminished, hidden costs from fragmentation, rapidly increasing data fees, and the risk of catastrophic
market dislocation have generated significant disquiet on the part
of stockbrokers, institutional investors, and advocates for the investing public. The historic mission of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC) to provide for investor protection is therefore implicated in the debate over the current market structure
under Regulation NMS.
In considering the way forward, it is important to remember
that the Order Protection Rule, the lynchpin of Regulation NMS, is
itself a compromise. Rule 611 only protects the quotes at the “topof-the-book,” the best-priced quote in the market at the time. It does
not provide “depth-of-book” protection to quotes lower down in
an exchange’s order book, nor does it provide timing protection to
previously entered quotes in accordance with the usual price-time
priority rules used at the individual exchanges.6 The various
6. See John McPartland, Recommendations for Equitable Allocations of Trades in High Frequency Trading Environments 10–11 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Policy Discussion Paper, Vol.
PDP, No. 2013-01, rev. Jul. 2014). See generally LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES: MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 116–20 (2003) (rule-based order-matching systems).
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proposals discussed in the long run-up to the promulgation of
Regulation NMS contain alternatives that should now be reconsidered as the digitization of stock trading exacerbates the problems
latent within the governing regulatory regime.
In fact, by the time it came into force in 2007, Regulation NMS
was already becoming obsolete.7 The alternative “hard CLOB”
proposal floated during the mid-70s, and which briefly reappeared
in 2000, may offer a more attractive market structure in the digital
age. A virtual central limit order book (CLOB) functioning as a
routing system that provides depth-of-book protection could accomplish two goals: First, it would eliminate many of the specific
problems that arise from the interaction of various heterogenous
groups of traders in the current highly fragmented system. Second,
it could form the basis for the governance structure of a key piece
of financial markets infrastructure that could mitigate the danger
of digital monopoly, or rather oligopoly, among the exchanges. The
nature of the stock exchange as a multi-sided platform (MSP)
means that as the exchange industry becomes wholly digital, the
pressures winnowing the exchanges to a single exchange, or small
group of exchanges, intensify. A CLOB as a routing service, but not
a single exchange, would allow the separate incumbent exchanges
to remain in existence, providing for a large degree of competition.
Furthermore, the governance of such a routing service would allow
for the interests of non-exchange stakeholders, primarily but not
only institutional investors, to be represented. Ultimately, it seems
that the future of the stock exchanges will present public policy
challenges similar to those posed by other dominant MSPs in the
digital era.
This Article has three parts. Part I reviews the recent changes in
the stock market in terms of five implicit assumptions of Regulation
NMS disrupted by digital technology. Part II then turns to an
examination of recent economic thinking on multi-sided platforms
in digital business environments. Since the business of running a

7. See generally Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1032–33 (2015); Christopher Groskopf, The Modern Stock Market Is a
Badly Designed Computer System, QUARTZ (June 15, 2016), https://qz.com/662009/the-sectried-to-fix-a-finance-problem-and-created-a-computer-science-problem-instead
(“Latency
arbitrage is a byproduct of the fact that Reg NMS neglected to take into account the problems
associated with building a distributed computer system.”).
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financial exchange has, like many others, been transformed into a
digital one, many of the economic conditions identified as
operative in digital MSPs are increasingly applicable to stock
markets. Stock markets have some key differences from other types
of MSPs, but they do share some important characteristics, in
particular the operation of network effects and the use of
differential pricing mechanisms across the sides of the platform.
Part III draws on the history of the development of the national
market system to formulate a proposal for a router functioning as a
virtual CLOB. A virtual CLOB would eliminate many of the most
important problems with the current system, while also potentially
providing a useful governance regime for a critical piece of
financial markets infrastructure.
I. THE OBSOLESCENCE OF REGULATION NMS:
FIVE ASSUMPTIONS DISRUPTED BY ALGORITHMIC TRADING
Now appears to be a good time to step back from the
controversies of recent years regarding high-frequency trading in
the stock markets. The Equity Market Structure Advisory
Committee, convened in 2015 by the SEC,8 has failed to issue any
recommendations on market structure issues,9 and the Tabb Group
reports that the profits of high-frequency traders have shrunk
radically in the past few years, from a high of approximately
$7 billion in 2009, to an estimated $1.1 billion in 2016.10 This radical
decline in profitability would seem to indicate that the scale of the

8. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Members of New Equity
Market Structure Advisory Committee (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/press
release/2015-5.html.
9. See Memorandum from the EMSAC Regulation NMS Subcommittee to the Equity
Market Structure Advisory Committee (EMSAC) (April 3, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/spot
light/emsac/emaac-regulation-nms-subcommittee-discussion-framework-040317.pdf (“Subject: Framework for Rule 611 & 610 Discussion”); see also Rob Daly, Trade-Through Review
Going Slowly, TRADERS MAG. (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/buy
side/trade-through-review-going-slowly-116104-1.html.
10. See Alexander Osipovich, High-Frequency Traders Fall on Hard Times, WALL STREET J.
(Mar. 21, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/high-frequency-traders-fall-on-hardtimes-1490092200; see also Gregory Meyer, Nicole Bullock & Joe Rennison, How HighFrequency Trading Hit a Speed Bump, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content
/d81f96ea-d43c-11e7-a303-9060cb1e5f44.
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problems associated with HFT is shrinking.11 HFT appears to be a
maturing industry in which the total amount of profit is declining
and less agile entrants are being driven out or acquired by more
powerful ones.12 This decline in profits may lessen the pressure for
a regulatory fix. Nevertheless, the changes wrought by algorithmic
trading, some of which are highly problematic, are not going away.
A useful way into the controversies surrounding Regulation NMS
is to examine a number of its grounding assumptions, which make
sense in a world of physical trading environments but break down
in the relatively disintermediated world of electronic stock trading.
A. Instantaneous Communication Between Markets Is Possible
A bedrock assumption of Regulation NMS is that communication between market centers will occur instantaneously. The
drafters of Regulation NMS were in fact aware of timing issues
concerning the operation of the stock markets, but the main
distinction they had in mind was that of automated versus manual
quotations.13 Manual quotations are those offered by a floor trader,
whereas automated quotations are those in a system such as
NASDAQ’s, which would be acted on without delay as soon as
they were entered into the system. Regulation NMS, however,
mostly ignores an entirely different category of timing delays: those
arising from the time it takes for automated messages to travel from
one market center (i.e., a computer server) to another.14
The basic informational architecture of Regulation NMS arises
out of the interplay between Rule 611’s Order Protection Rule and
the various “Plans” that are set up to consolidate and disseminate
order information and quotations to the market at large. Rule 611
11. An important caveat to this conclusion is that exchanges and other service
providers may simply be arrogating an increased share of the profits to themselves through
increased charges for the proprietary data, co-location, and technology services required to
compete in the HFT arena. See Orçun Kaya, High-Frequency Trading, DEUTSCHE BANK RES.,
(May 24, 2016), https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/RPS_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000
454703/Research_Briefing%3A_High-frequency_trading.PDF.
12. See Samuel Agini, High-Frequency Traders Feel the Pressure of One-Way Markets, FIN.
NEWS LONDON (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/high-frequency-trad
ers-feel-the-pressure-of-one-way-markets-20170317.
13. See, e.g., Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496,
37,519–20, 37,531 (June 29, 2005).
14. See infra note 21.
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prohibits “trade throughs” of all “protected quotations” in Regulation NMS stocks.15 This means that a trading center is required to
have policies in place that prevent a trade from being consummated
on its facility when a “protected quotation,”16 an automated quotation at a better price on a registered exchange, is displayed elsewhere in the national market system. In this situation, the order is
instead to be routed to that other exchange.
In order for this system to work, one or more SIPs17 are required
to act as central information processors. The SIPs receive and collate
the quotes from each exchange and then disseminate the best ones
as the national best bid/offer18 (the NBBO) to the market at large.
Rules 602 and 603 govern this activity. Rule 602 requires the exchanges to “make available to vendors the best bid, best offer, and
aggregate quotation sizes” for each listed security.19 Rule 603(b) in
turn requires the exchanges to “act jointly pursuant to one or more
effective national market system plans” to disseminate “all consolidated information for an individual NMS stock through a single
plan processor.”20 These rules call for the basic informational
architecture of Regulation NMS, consisting of a central information
processor (the SIP) that collates the information it receives from the
various market centers and then redistributes it to the market at
large as the NBBO.
It gradually became apparent after Regulation NMS came into
force that trading conducted within the timing gaps between the
market centers, and between the market centers and the SIP, was

15. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.611(a)(1) (2018).
16. See id. § 242.600(b)(58) (defining “protected quotation”).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(22)(A) (2012) (defining “securities information processor”).

This definition was added to the 1934 Act by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. The
SIP was seen by the 1975 Amendments as the mechanism that would allow the
accomplishment of its third objective, to assure “the availability to brokers, dealers, and
investors of information with respect to quotations for and transactions in securities.” Id.
§ 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(iii).
18. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(42) (“National best bid and national best offer means,
with respect to quotations for an NMS security, the best bid and best offer for such security
that are calculated . . . on a current and continuing basis by a plan processor pursuant to an
effective national market system plan.”).
19. Id. § 242.602(a)(1)(i).
20. Id. § 242.603(b).
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important.21 Regulation NMS, however, sidesteps the issue of these
timing gaps.22 During the gestation of Regulation NMS, the main
focus of regulators as far as timing was concerned centered on the
interplay between manual and automated quotations. Within the
decade, however, it became apparent that significant activity
occurred within periods that were considerably shorter than the
periods of three or ten or thirty seconds that the debate over
integrating manual quotations into the automated system considered. These gaps consisted of periods measured in milliseconds
(thousandths of a second) and even microseconds (millionths of a
second), from one second down to two milliseconds or even less.23
The inevitable delay between the NBBO as reported by the SIP and
what may be the best price at the exchanges prompted financial
sociologist Donald MacKenzie to characterize Regulation NMS as
assuming a Newtonian world, whereas the contemporary markets
are Einsteinian, “in which the time that communication takes, even

21. See, e.g., An Old SIP in a Modern Market, TRADERS MAG. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.
tradersmagazine.com/issues/26_356/An-Old-SIP-In-a-Modern-Market-111619-1.html.
Michael Lewis’s Flash Boys (2014) brought the problem of the staleness of the SIP to public
attention, but protagonist Brad Katsuyama (now CEO of IEX) began grappling with the
problems of negotiating the latencies between the various exchange servers in 2007.
MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS 34 (2014). Wall Street Journal reporter Scott Patterson also
explored these problems in a 2013 book. SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK P OOLS: THE RISE OF THE
MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING OF THE U.S. STOCK MARKET (2013).
22. The main discussion of timing differences down to the sub-second level occurs in
the context of automated vs. manual quotations. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496
(June 29, 2005). The discussion of the “flickering quotation” exception to the trade-through
rule does evidence awareness of the problem of timing gaps but concludes with the
statement that “[t]he Commission also notes that opportunities for arbitrage between trading
centers displaying different prices for the same NMS stock would exist irrespective of
whether the Commission adopted an order protection rule . . . .” Id. at 37,523; see also id. at
37,528 (acknowledging that intermarket price protection without an opt-out exception may
interfere with “extremely short-term trading strategies”); id. at n.215 (discussing concerns
over “‘clock drift’ and time lags between different data sources.”).
23. See An Old SIP in a Modern Market, supra note 21 (estimating the latency of the SIP
as 800 milliseconds in 2006). In Lewis’s Flash Boys, message transmission times in 2009 from
lower Manhattan to the exchange servers in New Jersey range from four to seven milliseconds. See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 71. Transmission times from co-located servers at the
exchanges are in the 0.2- to 0.35-millisecond range. See Deutsche Boerse Group’s Co-location
Service in Cooperation with Equinix, EUREX EXCHANGE, www.eurexchange.com/exchange
-en/technology/co-location-services (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). Processing times at the SIPs are
now as low as an astonishing twenty microseconds (0.020 milliseconds). See Nicole Bullock &
Philip Stafford, Nasdaq Upgrade Raises Market Data Questions, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/0de0a15c-9933-11e6-8f9b-70e3cabccfae.
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at the speed of light, is salient.”24 Regulation NMS implicitly presumes that instantaneous communication between market centers
is possible, whereas the development of high-speed computing
technology means that gaps of much less than one second are
very meaningful.
B. Limit Orders Are Good, and Regulation Should
Operate to Protect Them
A second assumption is that limit orders are good and that
regulation should operate to protect them.25 While order types have
mushroomed in the past decade, limit orders and market orders are
the two basic order types used by equities traders, as well as the
building blocks for more complex types. A market order is a simple
command to a broker to go into the market and purchase (or sell) a
given number of shares at the prevailing best price. A limit order,
on the other hand, is an order offering to buy (a bid) or sell (an offer)
a given amount at a given price.26 Assume that the NBBO for
General Motors (GM) stock is currently $42.50 (bid) and $42.55
(offer). A trader wishing to sell GM, but who thought the current
best price to buy was too low, could submit a new limit order to sell
1000 shares at $42.53. This limit order would now establish a new
best offer of $42.53, and the order would remain open until either a
buyer responded to this limit order and “hit” the quote, or the
trader cancelled it.
Limit orders play several important roles. Most importantly,
they set the prevailing prices. By announcing a price at which
traders are willing to buy or sell, limit orders are the basis for
market orders, since traders submitting a market order usually do
so on the basis of the current NBBO. And the combined limit orders
in the various order books of the exchanges constitute the “depth”
24. Donald MacKenzie, A Sociology of Algorithms: High-Frequency Trading and the
Shaping of Markets 41–42 (June 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk
/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/156298/Algorithms25.pdf.
25. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,505 (discussing commenters who “stress[]
that limit orders are the cornerstone of efficient, liquid markets and should be afforded as
much protection as possible”). For a critical appraisal, see Hearing on Equity Market Structure:
A Review of SEC Regulation NMS Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters.
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter Lofchie] (written testimony of
Steven Lofchie).
26. See Michael Morelli, Regulating Secondary Markets in the High Frequency Age: A
Principled and Coordinated Approach, 6 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 79, 82 n.81 (2016).
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of liquidity in a particular stock. This pool of liquidity is one of the
central reasons for forming a stock market, as greater liquidity in a
stock greatly increases its value to traders, who often wish to exit
an investment quickly and at the highest price available. A deep
pool of liquidity makes it possible to do so. Not only does it signal
a willing buyer at a pre-established price but depth of liquidity
ensures that an individual small purchase or sale will have a smallto-minimal effect on the prices of the remaining shares. Finally, a
limit order itself is a type of option: it provides other traders the
opportunity to make a transaction at a set price for as long as the
quote remains on the exchange’s order book.27 Today, it is the limit
order’s function as an option that threatens its economic viability.
Posting a limit order always entailed the risk that another trader
would see a bid as too high or an offer as too low. This judgment
could be based on fundamental analysis, inside information, shortterm predictions of market momentum, or other factors. But
whatever the reason, if such a judgment were correct, in the zerosum game of trading the person posting the limit order would
suffer a loss if her quote were hit. The risk for a trader submitting a
limit order (or conversely, its value to the market at large) is a
function of three factors: the discrepancy of the price in the order
versus the “true” value of the stock, the number of shares at stake,
and the amount of time the order remains open.28 The rise of HFT
appears to have increased the average magnitude of the first and
third factors. High-speed computing technology greatly increases
the ability of high-frequency traders to find and act on information,
including price momentum information. This heightens the adverse selection risk associated with limit orders.29 It also appears
that in the new world of HFT, the effective measure of time is
greatly sped up as compared to the old manual markets. Now, a far
greater volume of orders is entered per second, with most quickly
cancelled, than in the past.30 Since the “volume clock” of the current
markets is running so much faster than it used to, submitting limit
27. See Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,526–27
(June 29, 2005).
28. See Lofchie, supra note 25 at 6.
29. See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock
Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 238–42 (2015) (discussing “slow-market arbitrage”).
30. See David Easley, Marcos M. López de Prado & Maureen O’Hara, The Volume
Clock: Insights into the High-Frequency Paradigm, 39 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 19 (2012).
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orders in an old-fashioned way, without the wherewithal to monitor all markets and information sources and quickly pull the order
if negative information is spotted, becomes significantly riskier
than before. Because of these changes in how the stock markets
function, the risk inherent in limit orders has increased.
The natural response of many non-HFT traders has been to
migrate away from the lit markets. This is largely because dark
pools do not publicly post quotes for all to see and react to. By not
posting the quote, any information entailed in the limit order is not
revealed to the market at large, although there do appear to be ways
to access it.31 Furthermore, a number of dark pools have marketed
themselves as inhospitable to HFT, or as actively preventing HFT
shops from trading in their pools.32 Even though such claims have
not always been truthful, dark pools do function as “protective
coves,” as opposed to the “naked bazaars” of the lit markets.33 The
growth of dark trading will be explored in greater detail in
section II.B, but at this point it is important to realize that it is driven
by the costs, including risk, of trading the old-fashioned way with
limit orders on an exchange. The grounding assumption of
Regulation NMS, that resting limit orders are good and that
regulation should serve to protect them, may remain true in a
normative sense, but increasing adverse selection risk undermines
the economic basis many traders previously had for using them.
C. The Securities Information Processor (the SIP)
Presents Useful Information
A corollary to the first assumption of instantaneous communication between markets is that the SIP presents useful information. The SIP is the market institution responsible for collecting,

31. See Rob Curran, Watch Out for Sharks in Dark Pools, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 19, 2008,
11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121911298392752051. See generally Gregory
Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and “Front Running” in the Futures
Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607 (2015).
32. See Scott Patterson & Bradley Hope, Barclays Dark Pool Drew Early Alarms, WALL
STREET J. (July 20, 2014, 7:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/barclays-dark-pool-drew
-early-alarms-on-fast-trading-1405898592; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Barclays,
Credit Suisse Charged with Dark Pool Violations (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.sec.gov
/news/pressrelease/2016-16.html.
33. See Lofchie, supra note 25, at 5.
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collating, and distributing the quotes that make up the NBBO.34
Regulation NMS conceives of the SIP as the central informational
node in the market system, which should operate to place all
traders and investors on an even playing field, as well as to prevent
exploitation of traders through the exercise of market power over
the valuable market data by the exchanges. A crucial assumption
of Regulation NMS therefore is that the information presented by
the SIP is useful to market participants. As with the second
assumption above, the failure of this assumption is a matter of
degree—it is not entirely false, nor is it entirely true.
The SIP is the descendant of the “consolidated tape” which
provided transaction data to the market at large in the precomputerized era.35 While it was defined in the 1975 Amendments,36 it has been woven into the fabric of Regulation NMS. Rules
602 and 603 concern the provision and dissemination of quotations
in Regulation NMS stocks. Rule 602 requires that an exchange
collect quotes from broker-dealers and make those quotes available
to “vendors.”37 Rule 603 mandates that each exchange act pursuant
34. There are presently three SIPs for cash equities: Tape A (covering NYSE-listed
stocks), Tape B (covering stocks, structured products, and ETFs listed on neither the NYSE
or NASDAQ), and Tape C (covering NASDAQ-listed stocks). The Tape A and Tape B SIPs
are governed by the Consolidated Tape Association, a consortium of exchanges, and
managed by the NYSE. The Tape C SIP is governed and administered by NASDAQ. See Larry
Tabb, Latency Arbitrage and the Problem with the SIP, TABBFORUM (July 19, 2016),
https://tabbforum.com/opinions/latency-arbitrage-and-the-problem-with-the-sip. The OPRA
SIP covers exchange-traded securities options. See OPRA Overview, OPRA, https://opradata
.com/overview/opra_over.jsp (last visited Dec. 30, 2018).
35. See Jerry W. Markham, High-Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity Markets—From
Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 601 n.284 (2015); Dale A. Oesterle,
Regulation NMS: Has the SEC Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate to Facilitate a “National Market
System” in Securities Trading?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 613, 630–35 (2005).
36. Section 3(6) of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 added section 3(a)(22) to
the Exchange Act:
The term “securities information processor” means any person engaged in
the business of (i) collecting, processing, or preparing for distribution or publication, or assisting, participating in, or coordinating the distribution or publication
of, information with respect to transactions in or quotations for any security (other
than an exempted security) or (ii) distributing or publishing (whether by means of
a ticker tape, a communications network, a terminal display device, or otherwise)
on a current and continuing basis information with respect to such transactions
or quotations.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(22)(A).
37. The term “vendor” here refers to a securities information processor. See Regulation
NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,574 n.688 (June 29, 2005).
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to “one or more . . . national market system plans to disseminate
consolidated information, including a national best bid and best
offer, on quotations for and transactions in national market
stocks.”38 A SIP is established under a “national market system
plan.”39 Rule 603(a)(1) provides that “[a]ny exclusive processor, or
any broker or dealer with respect to information for which it is the
exclusive source, that distributes information . . . to a securities
information processor shall do so on terms that are fair and
reasonable.”40 Rule 603(a)(2) requires that “[a]ny national securities
exchange, . . . broker, or dealer that distributes information with
respect to quotations for or transactions in an NMS stock to a
securities information processor . . . shall do so on terms that are
not unreasonably discriminatory.”41 The SIP is therefore the entity
under Regulation NMS that is charged with collating and distributing this information to the market at large. Also important is the
distinction between an exclusive source of information providing it
on terms that are “fair and reasonable,” and all other providers
doing so on terms that are “not unreasonably discriminatory.”42
The development of high-speed trading led to great reductions
in the latency (the time it takes for messages to be transmitted) of
messages to and from the servers of the exchanges, which has had
the corresponding effect of making the NBBO as communicated by
the SIP increasingly “stale.”43 In addition to the simple effect of
decreases in message transmission times increasing the relative
significance of processing times at the SIP, co-location services and
the proprietary, enriched data feeds offered by the exchanges have
contributed greatly to its obsolescence. Co-location services allow
HFT firms to rent space in the facilities that host an exchange’s
servers, so messages will reach an exchange server in the least

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

17 C.F.R. § 242.603(b) (2018).
Id. § 242.600(b)(43).
Id. § 242.603(a)(1).
Id. § 242.603(a)(2).
Id. § 242.603(a); see also Fox et al., supra note 29, at 270–71.
See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 3461358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3593, 3601 (Jan. 21, 2010) (estimating latency of the SIP at approximately
five milliseconds); Shengwei Ding, John Hanna & Terrence Hendershott, How Slow Is the
NBBO? A Comparison with Direct Exchange Feeds, 49 FIN. REV. 313, 320 (2014) (estimating
latency of the SIP as approximately 1.5 milliseconds in 2012).
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possible amount of time.44 Co-location is the most obvious example
of traders positioning themselves in a way that makes the SIP stale,
but proprietary data feeds and the SEC’s interpretation of
Rule 603(a)(2) compound its effects. Proprietary data feeds are
delivered directly to co-located servers. They provide a greater
depth of information than the SIP, whose NBBO just presents the
best bid and offer nationally. Proprietary data feeds show an
exchange’s complete “book” in each stock, i.e., all the limit orders
going deeper into the book away from the best prices.45 Order
cancellation information is also available, which allows highfrequency traders the ability to draw a picture of the direction of
the market in a particular stock. The deeper and more detailed
information offered by the proprietary data feeds is essential for
HFT, which requires a more complete picture of the market to
engage in many short-term trading strategies.46
A key regulatory factor for proprietary data feeds is
Rule 603(a)(2), which states that an exchange “that distributes
information with respect to quotations for or transactions in an
NMS stock to a securities information processor, broker, dealer, or
other persons shall do so on terms that are not unreasonably
discriminatory.”47 The SEC interprets this to allow an exchange to
send information from its server to co-located servers, typically of
high-frequency traders, simultaneously with its transmission to the
SIP.48 This may have seemed sensible in 2005, but with the
development of high-speed transmission technology, and the

44. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 1030.
45. See SAL ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: HOW HIGH FREQUENCY

TRADING AND PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 111–17 (2011). Regulation NMS rejected a depth-of-book
requirement for the SIP, stating that the basic information of prices, sizes, and market
identifiers for the NBBO would be sufficient for retail investors, though the SEC also foresaw
other traders purchasing deeper information from market centers. See Regulation NMS,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,569 (June 29, 2005).
46. See IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES AND TRADING SYSTEMS 53–74 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the use of
both Level I and the deeper Level II categories of data by HFT’ers).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a)(2).
48. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567
(June 29, 2005) (“Stated another way, adopted Rule 603(a) prohibits an SRO or broker-dealer
from transmitting data to a vendor or user any sooner than it transmits the data to a Network
processor.”); see also Fox et al., supra note 29, at 269–71.
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corresponding lack of technological development at the SIP,49 it
meant that by the time messages were received at the SIP, processed there, and then released to the market at large, the NBBO was
significantly stale.50 The provision of enriched data feeds to colocated servers greatly reduces the value of the information offered
by the SIP, creating a two-tiered marketplace. High-speed traders
pay extra to be at the front of the line, while those relying on the
NNBO as communicated through the SIP are in back.
There are indications that the problems associated with the SIP
may be lessening, however. In 2016, NASDAQ upgraded the technology of the SIP it operates, reducing latency times from more
than one millisecond to just over half of a millisecond today.51
Reductions in this latency time are important, although in principle
there will always be some delay in the NBBO as reported by the SIP
in our current system. Improvements at the SIP could also be a
contributing factor in the declining profits of HFT firms and are
important for the effective operation of the national market system.
But there will always be an irreducible delay in the propagation of
the SIP, so to some extent the assumption that the SIP presents
valuable information will always be somewhat wrong. The fact that
many traders are willing to pay substantial amounts for co-location
and proprietary data feeds casts doubt on this assumption.
D. Sufficient Incentives Exist for Market Makers to Supply Liquidity
A fourth assumption of Regulation NMS is that sufficient
incentives exist for market makers to provide liquidity. In the old
NYSE “specialist system,” where specialists were granted a
monopoly position as market maker in the stocks they covered,
there was sufficient economic incentive to act as a market maker in
times of market stress. The demise of the specialist system and its
49. See An Old SIP in a Modern Market, supra note 21.
50. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
51. Although processing times at the upgraded SIP are in the 50-microsecond range,

including transmission times to other market centers would place the latency of the SIP in
the 500-microsecond range. See Ivy Schmerken, Nasdaq OMX Won Over SIP Committee with
Latency Reductions & Tech Upgrades, INFORMATIONWEEK WALLSTREET & TECH. (Nov. 7, 2014,
12:35 PM) http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/infrastructure/nasdaq-omx-won-over-sip
-committee-with-latency-reductions-and-tech-upgrades/d/d-id/1317316.html; Tabb, supra
note 34.

984

001.MCNAMARA_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

969

3/4/19 4:30 PM

The Stock Exchange as Multi-sided Platform

replacement by “Designated Market Makers” (or DMMs) (as well
as “Supplemental Liquidity Providers” or SLPs) illustrates the
difficulty of using the old regulatory categories in the new world of
digital markets. A related concern is the health of the trading
“ecosystem” in this new world, specifically the diversity of players
in the system and the decline in the numbers of various players,
particularly broker-dealers.
In the NYSE’s specialist system, specialists were granted the
right to see the order book in a particular stock.52 While they were
not supposed to trade on it, it is hard to believe that this information
did not constitute a valuable advantage in their market-making
activities.53 In exchange for advance knowledge of the order book
in the stocks it covered, the specialist assumed the obligation to
make a market in times of market stress, to be willing to buy those
stocks when investors would flee, and to sell when they all wanted
to buy. Specialists were therefore charged with standing on the
opposite side of the market from the general direction of the herd.
Economically, the positional advantages of being a specialist
appear to have more than compensated them for this role, and the
specialist system endured until the NYSE was thoroughly dominated by electronic traders.54 The specialist system at the NYSE was
phased out in 2008 and replaced with the new category of
“Designated Market Maker.”55
Since then, the market has struggled to find the appropriate
balance of positional advantage and affirmative obligations for
DMMs. The signal event in this quest was the “Flash Crash” of
52. See generally HARRIS, supra note 6, at 494–513; J OEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 335–44 (3d ed. 2003).
53. See CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY

EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND

223 (1997); see also Stanislav
Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchants of Liquidity: Market Making from Crowded Floors to HighFrequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 651, 667–68 (2016) (describing both the privileges and
obligations of market makers in the pre-Regulation NMS era); Hans R. Stoll, Electronic
Trading in Stock Markets, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 158–59 (2006) (detailing enforcement actions
against specialists abusing their privileges).
54. See Dolgopolov, supra note 53, at 662–67 (analyzing the economic forces affecting
the provision of liquidity in a specialist system).
55. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change to Create a New NYSE Market
Model, Exchange Act Release No. 34-58845, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,379 passim (Oct. 24, 2008); see also
Evangelos Benos & Anne Wetherilt, The Role of Designated Market Makers in the New Trading
Landscape, 2012(Q4) BANK OF ENG. Q. BULL. 343 (2012).
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May 6, 2010, when the stock market lost over a trillion dollars in
approximately thirty-six minutes.56 Subsequent smaller crashes
have also occurred.57 These sudden crashes reveal the susceptibility
of the stock markets to large and sudden swings in prices. The
failure demonstrated here is that the predominant liquidity
providers in the current market, high-frequency traders, are
skittish, cancelling their quotes and exiting as soon as they detect a
whiff of market instability. From their point of view, such behavior
is necessary in order to protect against standing on the wrong side
of the market and suffering significant losses.58 From the
perspective of the market as a whole, the provision of liquidity by
electronic traders lacks the incentives of the old specialist system,
which tended to mitigate market swings. This has led to complaints
about “phantom liquidity,” liquidity that appears on the order
books of the exchanges but is liable to vanish at the first signs
of stress.59
In the current system, the DMMs and SLPs should function as
a backstop of liquidity provision when high-frequency traders
withdraw from the market. In the Flash Crash and many smaller
“mini flash crashes,” they do not appear to have taken up this role.
The current system at the NYSE, as well as many other exchanges,
relies on DMMs to support trading by offering them certain
benefits, but not an advance look at trades coming into the stock

56. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS
REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 (2010) [hereinafter CFTC & SEC FINDINGS].
57. See Maureen Farrell, Mini Flash Crashes: A Dozen a Day, CNN MONEY (Mar. 20,
2013, 1:56 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2013/03/20/investing/mini-flash-crash/.
58. See, e.g., CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 56, at 48 (“In general . . . it appears that
the 17 HFT firms traded with the price trend on May 6 and, on both an absolute and net basis,
removed significant buy liquidity from the public quoting markets during the downturn.”).
59. See, e.g., The Cost of Phantom Liquidity, THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://blog.themistrading.com/2012/08/the-cost-of-phantom-liquidity/; see also Graham
Partington, Richard Philip & Amy Kwan, Is High Frequency Trading Beneficial to Market
Quality? (Ctr. Int’l Fin. & Regulation, Working Paper No. 083, 2015) (arguing that HFTs, more
often than not, supply liquidity on the “thick” side of the book where it is needed least). But
see Jesse Blocher, Rick Cooper, Jonathan Seddon & Ben Van Vliet, Phantom Liquidity and High
Frequency Quoting, 11 J. TRADING 6 (2016) (analyzing NASDAQ data to argue that “phantom
liquidity” is merely HFT firms continually adjusting their quotes); Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Hui Zheng, Limit Order Placement by High-Frequency Traders, 16 BORSA ISTANBUL
REV. 185, 205 (2016) (finding that HFT increases liquidity provision in times of
high volatility).
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exchange.60 Instead, DMMs can trade at parity with those orders
but are provided special quoting and fee rebates, particularly for
less active securities.61 These incentives do not always appear to
have been enough to prompt them to step into the breach.62 The
root cause of the problem appears to be the very unforgiving and
tightly coupled environment created by algorithmic trading and
low latency times. Any disadvantageous position will be quickly
and ruthlessly converted into a gain by a trader on the opposite side
of the market. In the old system, with broker-dealers on the floor of
an exchange, a specialist could stand by a position and, presumably, other traders would trade against it. The limited number of
traders on the floor and the timing gaps between outside information reaching floor traders, however, seem to have provided a
natural limit to how much a liquidity-providing stance could be
exploited. This in turn lent a certain measure of “stickiness” to the
market. In a digital environment, these natural limits are greatly
lessened, if not eliminated entirely. Digital markets challenge the
assumption that market makers have sufficient incentive to supply
liquidity in all market conditions.
E. The Stock Exchanges Are Properly Positioned to Be
Self-Regulatory Organizations
A fifth assumption under considerable strain is that the exchanges are properly positioned to be self-regulatory organizations
(SROs). While the factors undermining this role are complex, and
not entirely attributable to technological change, the complaint that

60. In the current electronic market, an advance look at the limit order book wouldn’t
even make sense. Nowadays, traders purchasing proprietary data feeds have knowledge of
such orders as soon as they come into the exchange and can act on these orders or modify
their own orders based on this information. In the old specialist system, the specialists were
the only participants with such knowledge. See Terrence Hendershott & Pamela C. Moulton,
Automation, Speed, and Stock Market Quality: The NYSE’s Hybrid, 14 J. FIN. MARKETS 568, 570–
71 (2011).
61. See Benos & Wetherilt, supra note 55; Designated Market Makers, NYSE (2018),
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/fact_sheet_dmm.pdf.
62. See JOINT CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES,
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6,
2010, at 10 (2011), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/sec-cftcjointcommittee/021811-report.pdf.
But see Adam D. Clark-Joseph, Mao Ye & Chao Zi, Designated Market Makers Still Matter:
Evidence from Two Natural Experiments, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 652 (2017).
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the exchanges privilege their best customers at the expense of
others goes to the heart of the problems with the current system.
The SRO system envisioned in the Exchange Act, as well as the 1975
Amendments, and even Regulation NMS, springs from the world
of open outcry trading with trading rooms, specialists, and floor
brokers, as well as off-exchange traders.
The 1934 Act classifies any “national securities exchange” as an
SRO.63 An SRO, in turn, is tasked with enforcing compliance with
the 1934 Act and its regulations, as well as the exchange’s own rules
among its members.64 Section 6(b)(5) outlines the objectives an exchange’s rules must advance:
The rules of the exchange are designed to prevent fraudulent
and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling,
processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market and a national market
system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public
interest; and are not designed to permit unfair discrimination
between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers, or to regulate by
virtue of any authority conferred by this title matters not related
to the purposes of this title or the administration of
the exchange.65

These more general goals of the SRO system made sense in
terms of the trading environment of the time. Exchanges were
cooperative institutions originally formed by the stockbrokers
themselves, and up until the 1990s, and 2006 in the case of the
NYSE, remained member-owned institutions. Most importantly, a
stock exchange possessed significant market power, if not outright
monopoly, either in its geographical region or with respect to the
particular securities traded on it.66 This market power gave it great
authority over its members, as the threat of enforcement and

63.
64.
65.
66.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2012).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3)(A).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5).
See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling SelfRegulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1091 (2005).
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ultimately expulsion could deprive a member of lucrative trading privileges.
The shift from cooperative ownership to the demutualized,
corporate stock exchange fundamentally upset this balance. While
there were numerous instances of exchanges failing to properly police their members in the pre-corporate era67 (with the resultant
harms falling on the investing public), the interests of the owners
in a cooperative exchange are aligned with those of its primary
customers, the broker-dealers, since these are the same parties.68 A
cooperative exchange possessing market power, whose option of
expulsion amounted to a significant threat that the exchange could
exercise with little harm to itself, would have an interest in
regulating its members for the larger success of the entire cooperative.69
In the case of a corporate exchange, however, the interests of
the owners and the customers are not aligned. Here, the
stockholders will only favor actions that contribute directly to
profitability, while the brokers will be mainly interested in paying
as low a fee as possible.70 The expense of regulation will come to
seem a cost that contributes to neither party’s immediate goals, and
any longer-term benefit to a strong regulatory function may seem
too remote to motivate significant devotion of time and resources.
Compounding the effects of demutualization is Regulation NMS,
which sets the exchanges in direct competition with one another for
order flow. Now, the exchanges are incentivized to cater to their
customers, particularly their best ones, the high-frequency traders,
not to enforce irksome discipline. In this environment, regulation
amounts to a public good that all financial market participants
benefit from, but no one exchange wants to fund.71 Individual
exchanges are therefore tempted to free-ride on the regulatory
efforts of others, partaking in the general benefits of strong

67. See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 52, at 335–44.
68. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.

2541, 2591 (2006).
69. See David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior by Users of Multi-sided Platforms, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201, 1231–35 (2012) [hereinafter Evans, Governing Bad Behavior].
70. See Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modern Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 1031,
1091–92 (2016).
71. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities
Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 576 (2005).
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regulatory enforcement while shirking the responsibility of paying
for it. In this new environment, the stiff competition for order flow
operates in conjunction with the demutualized, corporate status of
the exchanges to place regulatory efforts on the back burner.
The desperate competition for order flow in fact explains why
the exchanges have been accused of privileging high-frequency
traders. In the analysis of David Evans, a multi-sided platform,
which the stock exchange is, requires the ability to exclude parties
that violate the platform’s code of conduct.72 A properly functioning platform has an incentive to police bad behavior, because
doing so will increase the total value of the platform to its users as
well as the profits to its owners. In the present environment, the
lack of market power of any one exchange means that high-volume
customers are so valuable that exchanges are tempted to cater to
them at the expense of their other, less technologically sophisticated
ones. There is evidence to support this admittedly strong assertion.
In 2015, the BATS exchange paid a $14 million fine to settle an SEC
enforcement action that the Direct Edge exchange had selectively
disclosed how its “Hide Not Slide” order type functions.73 The
allegation was that BATS had informed high-frequency traders of
the details regarding the functionality of the Hide Not Slide order
but kept them from other market participants. Trader Haim Bodek
further alleged that many of the complicated “special order types”
are in fact developed by the exchanges working directly with HFT
firms, and their complexity and arguably unfair functionalities,
such as queue-jumping features, enable HFT firms to profit at the
expense of other traders.74 On a more general level, the development of co-location services and enriched data feeds, both used
by HFT firms to gain speed and informational advantages, creates
a two-tiered marketplace in which one set of traders profits at
another’s expense. Indeed, a number of commentators have

72. See Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at 1220.
73. See Bradley Hope, BATS to Pay $14 Million to Settle Direct Edge Order-Type Case,

WALL STREET J. (Jan. 12, 2015, 6:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/direct-edge-ex
changes-to-pay-14-million-penalty-over-order-type-descriptions-1421082603.
74. See Haim Bodek, Locked Markets, Priority and Why HFTs Have an Advantage: Part 2:
Hide & Light, TABBFORUM (Oct. 16, 2012), https://tabbforum.com/opinions/locked-markets
-priority-and-why-hfts-have-an-advantage-part-2-hide-and-light; see also PATTERSON, supra
note 21, at 204–05.
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characterized the profits made in this manner as a tax or rent on longterm investors, calling into question the ultimate social utility of
high-frequency trading that relies solely on positional advantage.75
From the perspective of the exchanges, however, it is necessary
to cater to their most important customers. The corresponding
failure of the exchanges as SROs is that they then permit and even
profit from “unfair discrimination between customers,” in the
language of Exchange Act section 6(b)(5).76 While this failure is not
the exclusive result of technological change, the development of
HFT in an environment of corporate exchanges set into direct competition with one another casts doubt on the assumption that the
exchanges can properly function as SROs in the manner the
Exchange Act intends.
The failure of these five assumptions shows the increasing
tension between Regulation NMS and the digital stock markets it
must now govern. With its origins in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Regulation NMS was formulated for an earlier age.
While it is neither an unalloyed success nor a complete failure, its
emphasis on setting the exchanges into competition with one
another faces considerable challenges for the future. The nature of
the stock exchange as a platform business, and how platforms
appear to operate in the digital environment, encapsulates
these challenges.
II. THE STOCK EXCHANGE AS DIGITAL MULTI-SIDED PLATFORM
What type of business is exchange trading, and how might this
affect the project of revamping the regulatory structure of the
national market system? The stock exchange is fundamentally a
multi-sided platform, a business through which disparate groups
come together to transact. The literature on MSPs illuminates a

75. See Fox et al., supra note 29, at 241–44; Albert S. Kyle & Jeongmin Lee, Toward a
Fully Continuous Exchange, 33 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 650, 651 (2017) (“The discreteness of
today’s market design creates rents for traders who have invested in costly superior
technology.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., High Frequency Trading Reform: The Short Term and the Longer
Term, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (July 21, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia
.edu/2014/07/21/high-frequency-trading-reform-the-short-term-and-the-longer-term/; see
also Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968, 971 (2016) (“[T]he
design of modern automated markets departs from past practice by expressly giving
meaningful informational advantages to select, high-speed algorithmic traders.”).
76. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012).
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number of the key features of stock markets both in their traditional
and digital forms. The stock exchange as MSP is also crucial to the
debate surrounding the pricing of exchange services through
“maker-taker” rebates, as well as governance in the exchange space
in the coming decades. Part II surveys the MSP literature and then
looks at the current fragmented markets with a view to how the
exchanges reflect the usual economic characteristics of MSPs. The
stock exchange is a unique type of MSP, bearing some but not all of
its typical characteristics.
Part II argues for the following propositions: (1) The stock
exchange itself is an MSP, and the debate over pricing for its
services should acknowledge this. Proposals to ban “maker-taker”
rebates therefore are in considerable tension with the underlying
economics of the digital stock exchange. (2) Exchange trading, both
in its pre-digital and current forms, is affected by strong centripetal
forces that tend to concentrate trading on one venue or a small
number of venues. Indeed, some economists have viewed financial
exchanges as natural monopolies. (3) Regulation NMS disrupts the
natural operation of the liquidity network effect. While customers
have benefited from the increased competition among the exchanges, which has driven down costs, a corollary of increased
competition is the reduced incentive for exchanges to function
effectively as SROs, as discussed above. (4) As competition has reduced the ability of exchanges to derive revenue from the provision
of trading services, they have increasingly become data-provision
businesses. Disputes surrounding data pricing have therefore come
to the fore in recent years, particularly with the ongoing
NetCoalition litigation.77 While the conventional economic view is
that each stock exchange functions as an individual MSP, to the
extent that they may be acting in concert regarding data pricing, the
exchanges begin to look like a collection of nodes that constitute a
single super-MSP. Of course, it is just this question of monopoly, or
rather, oligopoly, that is at issue in NetCoalition. The question of
whether exchange trading really is a natural monopoly, as many
economists suggest, and what an appropriate regulatory response
might be, introduces Part III.

77. See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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A. The Economics of the Stock Exchange
1. Why trade on an exchange?
It is common to see businesses of one type cluster together. In
New York City, think of the theater district, the diamond district,
the Fulton fish market, or Wall Street. In the case of a marketplace
or souk, having a number of vendors selling similar goods in one
place is beneficial for both buyers and sellers. Buyers can survey
the different product offerings side by side and negotiate amongst
the various sellers to find the one offering the best deal. Conversely,
sellers “want to be where the action is,” benefitting from the
increased traffic generated by many buyers. Buyers and sellers thus
interact in a way that creates a feedback loop, where more sellers
attract more buyers, and vice versa.78 Search costs are lowered for
all by congregating trade in one location.
Trading in stocks also tends to converge on a single venue.
Financial economists have built various models that provide a
formal explanation why this is so.79 The model of Marco Pagano
divides traders into two classes, large traders interested in liquidity
and speculators.80 Liquidity traders such as institutional investors
will need to sell an asset at a certain time. To obtain the best price,
they seek the market that can absorb their order with the least
amount of adverse effect on the price they will be offered, i.e., the
most liquid market. While speculators are primarily interested in
volatility, which offers the possibility of buying low and selling
high, they are also attracted to the market with the greatest volume
of trade because it offers the most potential matches. A feedback
loop thus arises between liquidity traders and speculators.81 The
78. See generally Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Lessons About Markets from the
Internet, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 142–43 (2005) (discussing agglomeration of trade in a variety
of businesses including stock exchanges).
79. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume
and Price Variability, 1 REV. FIN. STUD. 3 (1988); Marco Pagano, Trading Volume and Asset
Liquidity, 104 Q.J. ECON. 255 (1989); Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization,
43 J.L. & ECON. 437 (2000) [hereinafter Pirrong, A Theory]; Craig Pirrong, The Organization of
Financial Exchange Markets: Theory and Evidence, 2 J. FIN. MKTS. 329 (1999) [hereinafter Pirrong,
Organization of Financial Exchange Markets]; Lester G. Telser, Why There Are Organized Futures
Markets, 24 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1981).
80. See Pagano, supra note 79, at 255–57.
81. Id. at 256.
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model of Pagano shows that, under stylized conditions, including
that trade is costless, trade will converge on a single market.82
Complementing Pagano’s model is that of Anat Admati and Paul
Pfleiderer, which explains why trade in specific stocks tends to
congregate at various times of the day, such as the periods
immediately after the market opens and just before its close.83 In
their model, liquidity traders want to trade when they believe the
market will be thickest, thus attracting informed traders as well.84
These models therefore provide a theoretical explanation for the
congregation of trade on specific markets and at specific times.
They also imply that, in the simplest situation, trading in
financial instruments is a natural monopoly.85 This corresponds to
the commonly observed phenomenon that trading in a particular
stock or financial instrument tends to cluster in one location or
venue. While regulation at either the stock exchange level, such as
former NYSE Rule 390, or at the level of the market as a whole, such
as the Order Protection Rule of Regulation NMS, can encourage or
discourage such clustering, the models imply that in the abstract
world of financial theory, exchange trading is a natural monopoly.
Perhaps more intuitively, a number of important economists have
viewed a single exchange as in principle the most efficient arrangement for securities trading.86 The models account for fragmentation
of trading as well. According to Pagano, where transaction costs
differ in markets, and large traders fear adverse price changes, they
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 262.
See Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 79.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 33 (“In equilibrium, discretionary . . . trading is typically concentrated. . . .
[, and i]nformed traders trade more actively in periods when liquidity trading is
concentrated.”); Pagano, supra note 79, at 262 (“Thus, if trade is costless (or equally costly),
all traders tend to concentrate on a single market.”); Pirrong, Organization of Financial
Exchange Markets, supra note 79, at 330 (“[T]rading of particular financial instruments exhibits
strong natural monopoly characteristics . . . .”).
86. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
July–Aug. 1971, at 28, 29 (“It appears that the market for a single stock is most efficient if all
orders for the stock come in to a single point, so that all potential buyers can be exposed to
all sell orders, and all potential sellers can be exposed to all buy orders.”); George J. Stigler,
Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 129 (1964) (“The greater the number
of transactions in a security concentrated in one exchange, the smaller the discontinuities in
trading and the smaller the necessary inventories of securities. As a result the price of a
security will almost invariably be ‘made’ in one exchange.”); see also Lawrence R. Glosten, Is
the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?, 49 J. FIN. 1127 (1994).
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will trade on the market (or search off-exchange) with higher
transaction costs.87 Pagano provides the example of off-exchange
trading in the Italian stock market; another example would be the
“upstairs” market at the NYSE, which was the precursor to today’s
dark pools. Fragmentation therefore occurs when the combination
of transaction costs and different sizes of pools of liquidity make it
advantageous for some traders to turn to a second market or to
individualized search.
A final theoretical observation to note is Craig Pirrong’s argument that natural monopoly can coexist with supra-competitive
profits in the world of member-owned financial exchanges.88 By
restricting their numbers, the members of a cooperative exchange
will increase each individual seat holder’s return. The cost of
competing with the exchange however may prevent a competitor
from arising: “Under plausible conditions, exchanges have enough
members to make it unprofitable for competing exchanges to form,
but fewer members than is socially optimal.”89 Pirrong surveys the
prices for seats on various financial exchanges, finding evidence
that the exchanges had done exactly that.90 Of course, the major
impetus for Regulation NMS was to reduce the monopoly profits
of the NYSE members. While the solution has led to problems of its
own, which are the subject of this Article, it is important to
remember the original problem it was intended to deal with:
monopoly rents accruing to members in the form of high transaction costs.

87.
88.
89.
90.

See Pagano, supra note 79, at 256.
See Pirrong, Organization of Financial Exchange Markets, supra note 79, at 339.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 349–53. Pirrong uses the measure “Tobin’s q,” defined as “the ratio of the
market price of financial claims outstanding against a firm to the replacement value of the
firm’s assets,” to investigate whether the price of seats on an exchange capitalizes economic
rents. In a perfectly competitive industry, with no barriers to entry, Tobin’s q should be 1.00.
Looking at the prices for seats on the Chicago Board of Trade; the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange; the New York Cotton Exchange; the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange; the New
York Stock Exchange; and the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Pirrong finds that the q ratio
in each case exceeded 1.00 and was typically above 2.00. The q ratio for the NYSE ranged
from a high of 4.05 in 1987 to a low of 1.25 in 1991. These Tobin’s q ratios thus provide
evidence that the profits earned by exchange members constitute economic rents generated
by restricting membership.
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2. Multi-sided platforms
Over the past fifteen years economists have begun to study
platform businesses or “multi-sided platforms.”91 MSPs are businesses that mediate between two or more groups of customers. A
crucial swath of businesses in the economy perform this function in
many different ways—commonly cited examples include recent
digital platforms such as Amazon, Uber, and the like, but predigital examples include credit cards, shopping malls, financial
exchanges, and even newspapers. While there are many types of
MSPs, any business that allows for the direct interaction of two or
more disparate groups of consumers has features of a multi-sided
platform.92 Financial exchanges have long been recognized as an
important type of MSP, although there has been little specific study
of them as a particular type of MSP.93
MSPs are businesses that exhibit strong “indirect network
effects.” This means that users on one side of the platform are
attracted to, and benefit from, a large number of users on the other
side.94 In the case of a shopping mall, individuals shopping for new
clothes will be attracted to a mall with many clothing retailers.
Likewise, investors looking to buy stock on a stock exchange will
91. While many papers, including those of Rochet & Tirole, refer to “two-sided
markets,” the term “multi-sided platforms” seems more appropriate because many of these
markets have a multiplicity of customers. Stock exchanges, for example, cater not only to
buyers and sellers of securities but to issuers; there are also purchasers of market data, who
may or may not be buyers and sellers. The platform itself is also important. For
terminological discussion, see Ellison & Ellison, supra note 78, at 146; David S. Evans,
Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1987, 1994
n.31 (2008) [hereinafter Evans, Antitrust Issues]; Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, Multi-sided
Platforms, 43 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 162 (2015); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided
Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 645 n.1 (2006) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole,
Two-Sided Markets].
92. See Andrei Hagiu, Multi-sided Platforms: From Microfoundations to Design and Expansion Strategies (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-094, 2006); Jean-Charles Rochet &
Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003) [hereinafter Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition].
93. See Jose Miguel M. Abito, A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Stock Exchanges (2006)
(unpublished Honours B.Soc.Sci. thesis, National University of Singapore); see also Michael
Castelle, The Platform as Exchange: Financial Metaphors for the Regulation of Marketplace
Platforms, O XFORD INTERNET INST. IPP2016, at 10 (2016); Evans, Antitrust Issues, supra note 91,
at 1996; Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at 1231–35; Jonathan D. Levin, The Economics of Internet Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16852, 2011).
94. See Hagiu, supra note 92, at 3; see generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems
Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 97–98 (1994).
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be attracted to an exchange with a large number of sellers posting
offers. The hallmark of an MSP is the operation of indirect network
effects whereby a group on one “side” of the platform is affected by
the number of users on the other side. (Direct network effects on
the other hand are where customers are affected by the number of
users on the same side—for example, a person signs up for telephone service because many others have signed up as well, and it
will be easy to communicate with them.95)
The economics literature specifies the essence of an MSP more
precisely, however. In the pioneering articles of Jean-Charles
Rochet and Jean Tirole, the defining characteristic of an MSP is that
the total amount of activity conducted on the platform is affected
not just by the total price charged for the service but by the
breakdown of fees allocated to each side. According to Rochet and
Tirole, “a two-sided market [is] one in which the volume of
transactions between end-users depends on the structure and not
only on the overall level of the fees charged by the platform.”96 This
specification is crucial for the economics of MSPs and illuminates
many commonly observed phenomena surrounding platforms. For
example, why do most large American cities have a weekly
newspaper distributed free of charge to commuters? Why do bars
often host a “ladies’ night” where women are charged half price for
drinks? In the analysis offered by the MSP literature, these pricing
strategies make sense in that they increase the volume of
participants on one side of the market to a level that will cause the
overall value created by the platform to increase.97 As Rochet and
Tirole note, these differences in pricing often lead to disputes about
whether a group is being charged too much—as we see in the
disputes over fees and rebates at the stock exchanges.98 In the
95. See Evans, Antitrust Issues, supra note 91, at 1993 n.27.
96. Rochet & Tirole, Two-Sided Markets, supra note 91, at 646; see also Rochet & Tirole,

Platform Competition, supra note 92, at 1018 (“[T]he volume of transactions on and the profit
of a platform depend not only on the total price charged to the parties to the transaction, but
also on its decomposition.”).
97. See David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 71,
75 (2011).
98. See David S. Evans, Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries, 2 REV.
NETWORK ECON. 191, 193–97 (2003) (“Optimal prices are not proportional to marginal
costs . . . .”) [hereinafter Evans, Some Empirical Aspects]; Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition,
supra note 92, at 1018–19; see also infra Section II.B.3.a (“Maker-taker pricing”).
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examples above, MSPs function as matchmakers that operate to
reduce search costs for disparate groups of users.99 In the language
of economics, the positive externalities of the MSP are “internalized” by the network in the form of lower search costs.100 The
platform has a valuable role to play by offering much lower search
costs to participants than the available alternatives.
A second important feature of MSPs is that they often lower
search costs by certifying or monitoring participants on one or
multiple sides of the platform.101 An example would be seller
certifications on Amazon.com, where sellers of books or other
products are rated as to their reliability, or Airbnb.com, where hosts
are rated as to their service levels. On the stock exchange, these
certifications have long been important—a broker holding a seat on
the NYSE, or an NASD (now FINRA) member trading on
NASDAQ, possessed an important qualification.102 Furthermore,
this certification was connected to an important set of rules that
policed conduct on the exchange, providing a guarantee (not
always realized, of course) to customers of legal and ethical conduct
by stockbrokers. While it is questionable whether the exchanges are
presently incentivized to police their members’ conduct, this
traditionally has been an important aspect of the stock exchange’s
role as an MSP.103
A final point to note is the distinction between “multi-homing”
and “single-homing.”104 Multi-homing is where one side to the
exchange can easily use competing networks, such as a consumer
who carries both Mastercard and American Express credit cards.
Single-homing, on the other hand, is where it is only feasible for a

99. The matchmaker role played by MSPs reflects the fact that they solve bargaining
problems between parties in situations in which the Coase theorem does not apply. See
Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at 1203; Rochet & Tirole, Two-Sided Markets,
supra note 91, at 649.
100. See Evans, Some Empirical Aspects, supra note 98, at 192–93.
101. See Hagiu, supra note 92, at 5–6, 15; Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at
1218–26.
102. See Lofchie, supra note 25.
103. See Yesha Yadav, Oversight Failure in Securities Markets, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2754786; Lofchie, supra
note 25.
104. See Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668,
669–70 (2006); Rochet & Tirole, Two-Sided Markets, supra note 91, at 659–60.
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group of users to use one network: issuers listing their stock on a
particular exchange, or shoppers in a regional city with only one
shopping mall, would be single-homing. The importance of singlehoming is that in cases where all users must single-home, the
network looks like a utility-type situation where monopoly is often
the most efficient structure.105 In the case of a stock exchange, however, buyers and sellers don’t have to single-home, and they
typically multi-home by monitoring prices on many venues and
consummating a transaction on the one displaying the most
favorable price. As discussed further below, the stock exchanges
have a complex institutional landscape with some but not all
features of classic MSPs. While issuers (typically but not always)
single-home, the other groups of exchange customers typically multi-home.
3. The effects of digitization
As the examples of Amazon, Microsoft, Airbnb, Expedia, Uber,
and others indicate, MSPs are rapidly increasing in importance as
information technology and the internet develop.106 Many of the
most important businesses in the world right now are MSPs, and
most established industries are in various, often near-complete,
stages of transformation due to the digitization of commercial life.
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter have essentially created the
entirely new industry of social media, while Amazon has
transformed the preexisting retail sales industry. At the opposite
end of the spectrum from social media—largely a new creation—
are the stock exchanges. While the transformation of financial
markets is thoroughgoing, it is the result of the application of
computer technology to a highly detailed, preexisting business and
regulatory framework, not the creation of an entirely new business.107 As Part I above explores, digitization creates significant
105. See Armstrong, supra note 104, at 670 (“[W]here all users must single-home. . . . the
efficient outcome is for all agents to use the same platform.”).
106. See Hagiu, supra note 93, at 2; Günter Knieps & Johannes M. Bauer, The Industrial
Organization of the Internet, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET 23, 31–32
(Johannes M. Bauer & Michael Latzer eds., 2016).
107. See Castelle, supra note 93 (arguing that regulators grappling with the “emergent
organizational and regulatory complexities” of MSPs should draw on the example of securities regulation, which has gradually encompassed electronic stock exchanges).
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tension within this framework, and key assumptions no longer
hold good. Nevertheless, the application of advanced computer
technology does not have the same character as in other industries
which have been newly created out of the whole cloth of the
internet, such as social media, or just radically transformed by it,
such as retail. While the “death of distance” and increasing returns
to scale enabled by the internet have radically transformed many
traditional businesses,108 their effect on the financial exchanges
appears less profound. The preexisting business and regulatory
structure already enabled a high degree of connection with
investors not present at an exchange through brokers holding seats
there, and an infrastructure that could handle a substantial volume,
and increase in volume, of transactions.
The transformation of the exchanges by advanced information
technology may be more subtle than in other industries, then.
Nevertheless, its effects are significant. First, with the digitization
of financial markets has come a decreasing need for various
categories of financial intermediaries. Information technology fuels
disintermediation here because there is less of a role for specialized
parties in electronic stock markets.109 The “death of the specialist”
on the NYSE is the most obvious example of this: no longer do we
need specialists in each listed stock to act as matchmakers on the
trading floor.110 The death of the specialist really traces back to
NASDAQ’s quote-driven market, which operated with brokerdealers communicating with one another telephonically, unlike the
open outcry auction market at the NYSE.111 In addition to dispensing with the specialists, the current market is disintermediating
further, with a steep decline in the number of broker-dealers in

108. See Justus Haucap & Torben Stühmeier, Competition and Antitrust in Internet
Markets, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET 183, 184–88 (Johannes M. Bauer
& Michael Latzer eds., 2016); Knieps & Bauer, supra note 106, at 24.
109. See generally Brummer, supra note 7, at 1024–31; ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN,
CHASING THE TAPE: INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY IN CAPITAL MARKETS 182 (2015); see also
Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange, Part II, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec.
1971, at 24, 86–87.
110. See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 897–900 (2008).
111. See Stoll, supra note 53, at 159–60.
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recent years.112 With more and more retail investing going through
online brokerages such as E-Trade and Charles Schwab, there is less
business for the local, smaller brokerage houses. As Pirrong noted
in 2000, computer-driven markets drive disintermediation, and the
development of the markets since then illustrates this.113
A second effect of digitization is the rapid development and
application of special order types. Throughout most of the history
of the exchanges, orders came in two basic forms: a limit order,
which was a standing order to buy or sell a certain number of shares
at a fixed price, and a market order, which was an immediate order
to buy or sell a certain number of shares at the current market
price.114 As the exchanges digitized, becoming essentially complicated, rule-based matching engines housed in computer servers,115
it became much easier to develop and apply complicated and
specialized order types. Now orders such as Midpoint Immediate
or Cancel, Adding Liquidity Only Limit, Day ISO (Intermarket
Sweep Order), Non-Displayed Limit, and various types of auction
orders, activated at the open or close of trading, are offered by the
exchanges.116 Many of the special order types developed in recent
years are designed to take advantage of, or guard against, various
local conditions in the electronic markets.117 The development of
complex order types is an example of the innovation and
customization available to operators of online, algorithmic businesses.118 It also reflects the fact that digitization allows for vastly

112. See Hester Pierce, Dwindling Numbers in the Financial Industry, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (May 15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dwindling-number
s-in-the-financial-industry/ (detailing a decline of 5892 broker-dealers registered with the
SEC in 2007 to 3989 in 2017); see also Richard Johnson, Brokers Adapt to Shrinking Equity
Commissions, GREENWICH ASSOCIATES (July 27, 2017), https://www.greenwich.com/equities
/brokers-adapt-shrinking-equity-commissions.
113. See Pirrong, A Theory, supra note 79, at 460.
114. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
115. See Paul G. Mahoney & Gabriel Rauterberg, The Regulation of Trading Markets: A
Survey and Evaluation 4 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper Series
No. 2017-07, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955112 (“It is tempting to think of a stock
market as a facility, physical or virtual, but it is better described as a set of rules and
procedures pursuant to which investors buy and sell securities.”).
116. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 13 (2018) (listing and defining various order types).
117. See ALDRIDGE, supra note 46, at 44–45; Morelli, supra note 26.
118. See Levin, supra note 93, at 11.
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increased information flows.119 The panoply of sophisticated order
types both requires a great amount of data to function, and in turn
produces a great amount of data available for use, at a price, by
financial markets participants at large.
Finally, the development of the internet has allowed new entrants to compete against established players.120 This is true of the
stock exchanges, although after the rush to compete against the
NYSE in the wake of Regulation NMS, it appears that the opposite
has been true, and the markets have settled into a stable allocation
of market share among a few major players.121 In 2005, the NYSE
was still a monopoly exchange, handling approximately 80% of the
trading in NYSE-listed shares. A number of new entrants quickly
arose, including BATS and Direct Edge, and the NASDAQ encroached on the NYSE as well. After a few years of growth, a wave
of consolidation occurred, with BATS acquiring the Direct Edge
exchanges and the dominant exchanges within the NASDAQ and
NYSE families each holding on to 15–20% of the market.122 While
there is intense competition among the exchanges, at present it
appears difficult for new entrants to break into the industry. The
Investors Exchange (IEX), headed by Flash Boys protagonist Brad
Katsuyama, is an important case in point.123 Despite marketing
itself as a more ethical alternative to the major stock exchanges, it
has not been able to capture more than 3% of the market. 124 IEX
appears to be a cautionary tale for would-be entrants. The reasons
for its struggles are complex but may be evidence that, like other
online businesses, the exchange business shows a heightened
tendency to winnow down to one, or a small number, of players
in a “winner-takes-all,” or more accurately “winner-takesmost,” tournament. 125

119. See Nicholas Economides, The Impact of the Internet on Financial Markets, 1 J. FIN.
TRANSFORMATION 8 (2001).
120. See Fleckner, supra note 68, at 2566–67; Knieps & Bauer, supra note 106, at 24.
121. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
122. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
123. See infra Section III.B.6.
124. See Nicole Bullock, IEX Chief Sticks to Principles in Battle for Presence, FIN. TIMES
(June 1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/4c805dd6-449f-11e7-8519-9f94ee97d996.
125. See Economides, supra note 119, at 9; Evans, Antitrust Issues, supra note 91, at 2003.
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B. The Exchanges Under Regulation NMS —
A Network of MSPs or a Super-MSP?
In the decade since Regulation NMS came into force, the most
important, and controversial, effects of digital technology on the
stock market have come from HFT. Both the activities of highfrequency traders themselves and the response of the exchanges
and others, such as dark pool operators and institutional traders,
have played a role. The story of this transformation bears strong
evidence that the exchanges are MSPs. Most obviously this is seen
in the development of “maker-taker” pricing schemes at the
exchanges, but the use of digital technology to implement special
order types, as well as launch new exchanges, also fits the pattern
of MSPs in the digital business environment. Meanwhile, these
economic and technological developments have played out under
the new regulatory regime of Regulation NMS. Two provisions of
Regulation NMS are most important for the stock exchanges as
MSPs: By “socializing order flow” the Order Protection Rule (Rule
611) weakens the liquidity network effect, and the Access Rule
(Rule 610) provides the parameters within which the exchanges can
offer rebates to broker-dealers for providing order flow, i.e.,
liquidity. The operation of these rules in the new environment has
resulted in intense competition among the exchanges. Traders have
paid lower fees, as intended, but in response the exchanges have
sought alternative revenue sources in the form of higher fees for
their proprietary data. The ensuing disputes over the exercise of
market power on the part of the exchanges leads back to the
question of monopoly—or now, oligopoly—power that was the
original impetus for the 1975 Securities Acts Amendments. Profits
the exchanges can no longer make from the provision of trading
services are now supplanted by profits from the sale of information
generated by those trading services.
Section II.B surveys the current state of the markets, with an eye
on the nature of the stock market as MSP. Market fragmentation
has increased greatly in recent years, particularly in the migration
of trading to dark pools and other non-exchange venues;
fragmentation among the lit markets is less important, however, as
four exchanges, grouped into three exchange families, hold the
bulk of the market share. Nevertheless, the response of the
exchanges to the current environment bears cause for concern, as
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certain techniques appear to tilt the playing field to the benefit of
some and disadvantage of others. The current state of the markets
is complex. Regulation NMS cuts against the nature of the stock
market as an MSP, with its strong pressures toward centralization,
to the benefit of customers through increased competition. On the
other hand, it creates an environment that allows a host of other
costs and inefficiencies to take root, jeopardizing the SEC’s mission
of investor protection.
1. Dark fragmentation
While stock trading is now fragmented among thirteen
exchanges, a significant share of trading occurs outside of the
exchanges entirely. The most basic type of fragmentation then is
between the “lit” markets, or the registered exchanges, and the
“dark” markets, or “dark fragmentation.”126 At present, about 40%
of stock (by dollar volume) is traded off-exchange in a variety of
venues.127 Stock also trades off-exchange in the internalization
engines of broker-dealers such as the large banks, and in the
private, “upstairs” market.128 Dark pools are probably the best
known of these venues. They are known as “dark” venues because,
unlike at the exchanges, the quotes (buy and sell orders) submitted
to them are not publicly displayed. When a trade is made, however,
that information is sent to the SIP and so contributes to the price
discovery process after the fact.129 Dark pools are governed by
Regulation Alternative Trading Systems (Regulation ATS) under
the 1934 Act and are required to register as broker-dealers.130
The volume of stock traded off-exchange has risen considerably
in recent years. At the time Regulation NMS came into force, it was
estimated that only 4% of shares traded in alternative venues.131 By
126. See Ryan J. Davies & Erik R. Sirri, The Economics and Regulation of Secondary
Trading Markets 15 (Jul. 20, 2017) (working paper) (on file with Columbia University, The
New Special Study of the Securities Market), www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files
/microsites/capital-markets/davies_sirri_20170720_final_draft.pdf.
127. See Equities LiquidityMatrix, TABBFORUM (Sept. 14, 2018), https://tabbforum.com
/liquidity-matrix?ticket=ST-15372207594461-IJd8RwED8FV9IZop0j3uSVBWoc7a9YiYhpUHUL4c.
128. See COWEN ATM, supra note 2.
129. See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 2, at 2.
130. Id. at 5.
131. See Scott Patterson, ‘Dark Pools’ Face Scrutiny, WALL STREET J. (June 5, 2013, 9:55 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324069104578527361102049152.
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2016, that amount had climbed to approximately 36%.132 Of this
36%, approximately 13% traded in dark pools, with the other 23%
trading in other off-exchange venues.133 Fueling the rise of alternative trading venues is the search for lower transaction costs, as
well as a desire to avoid interacting with high-frequency traders.
Because orders submitted to dark pools are not publicly posted or
otherwise distributed, it is in principle more difficult for highfrequency traders to trade against these orders or otherwise exploit
them. While trading in dark pools clearly entails risks,134 investors
are attracted to them because trading on the exchanges also entails
significant risk of adverse selection, as well as higher fixed costs.135
As Stephen Lofchie suggests, instead of thinking of dark pools as
something sinister or bad, it might be more appropriate to think of
them as “protective coves.”136
The rise of dark pools and off-exchange trading has been
controversial and certainly carries with it considerable negative
externalities. Most importantly, traders submitting quotes are not
contributing to the price discovery process surrounding a stock but
are instead free-riding on prices generated on the lit markets.
Insofar as the stock exchange is a mechanism for allocating capital
efficiently, significant amounts of dark trading detract from this
important public function.137 On the other hand, the rise of dark
pools has coincided with the growth of HFT and must be seen as
an effort on the part of investors to avoid the risks and costs of the
lit markets. Turning back to the economic theory discussed above,
the model of Pagano predicts that fragmentation will occur when
different groups of investors have different cost and risk profiles.138
132. See COWEN ATM, supra note 2.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 32; see also Christopher

Mercurio, Dark Pool Regulation, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 69 (2013).
135. See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 2, at 4–5; Lofchie, supra note 25, at 4–6; Yadav,
supra note 103, at 33–35; see also Frank Hatheway, Amy Kwan & Hui Zheng, An Empirical
Analysis of Market Segmentation on U.S. Equities Markets 52 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
2399, 2401 (2017) (“[A]dverse selection risk on dark venues is 60% to 80% less than that on
lit markets . . . .”).
136. Lofchie, supra note 25, at 5.
137. See DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 109, at 62; Hatheway et al., supra note 135, at 2424–
25; see also Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1607 (2015).
138. See Pagano, supra note 79, at 268–69.
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The rise of dark pools must be understood in light of the risks posed
to slower, longer-term investors by trading on the exchanges. While
in principle it may be best for trading to occur on lit markets, it is
difficult to blame investors for wanting to trade in the dark markets
in search of lower transaction costs and less risk of adverse selection. Nevertheless, dark fragmentation has significant drawbacks—
it can result in negative effects on market quality, and if financial
markets information is a public good, insofar as only post-trade
information is reported, dark trading fails to contribute to its
creation and free-rides on prices created by the lit markets.139 And
these more general considerations are buttressed by the instances
in which dark pool operators failed to safeguard their venues for
all their customers.140
2. Visible fragmentation
The 64% of trading volume that occurs on the “lit” markets is
itself fragmented among the thirteen different stock exchanges. Of
these markets, the data provided by Cowen ATM indicates that no
single exchange has more than 14% of the total.141 It must also be
noted that eleven of the exchanges are grouped under three holding
companies that offer different venues, each catering to different
groups of investors through different pricing mechanisms. The
NYSE group operates the NYSE, NYSE Arca, and NYSE American142 exchanges, as well as the NYSE National, which traces its
existence back to the National Stock Exchange and before that the
Cincinnati Stock Exchange.143 NASDAQ operates the NASDAQ
139. See DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 109, at 27–28; see also J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffry M.
Netter & James A. Overdahl, Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial Exchanges from
a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J. L. & ECON. 591 (1991).
140. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 32. See generally Brian P.
Baxter, The Securities Black Market: Dark Pool Trading and the Need for a More Expansive
Regulation ATS-N, 70 VAND. L. REV. 311 (2017).
141. See COWEN ATM, supra note 2.
142. Formerly the NYSE MKT, the NYSE American is intended to compete with IEX
and includes a 350-microsecond “speed bump” and a reliance on midpoint orders. Such a
move is ironic, considering the NYSE’s vociferous opposition to IEX’s application to become
a registered exchange. See John D’Antona, NYSE American Marketplace Launches, TRADERS
MAG. (July 25, 2017), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/ecns_and_exchanges/nyse
-american-marketplace-launches-116480-1.html.
143. See NYSE Regulation, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/regulation (last visited
Dec. 30, 2018).
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(with 14.0% of volume, the single largest exchange),144 NASDAQ
BX, and NASDAQ PSX exchanges.145 And Cboe Global Markets
operates the BZX (Bats-Z), BYX (Bats-Y), EDGA, and EDGX
exchanges.146 These three groups therefore comprise the dominant
operators of exchange services in the American market. Finally,
there is the Investors Exchange, or IEX, and the Chicago Stock
Exchange, CHX.147 Given that IEX and CHX together currently
account for less than 4.0% of market volume, the market for equity
trading services exhibits a high degree of consolidation when
considered from the point of view of ownership of the
various exchanges.
Upon the promulgation of Regulation NMS, but before it came
into force in 2007, the bulk of trading still occurred on the NYSE:
the NYSE held on to nearly 80% of the trading in NYSE-listed
stocks.148 It is important to note that NYSE Rule 390, which had
prevented NYSE members from trading NYSE-listed stocks
anywhere other than on the NYSE, was repealed in 2000.149 Despite
that rule change, the NYSE held on to the vast bulk of American
stock trading.
By 2016, the market was split into the following venues:150

144. See COWEN ATM, supra note 2.
145. See Nasdaq Equities Market Data, NASDAQ, https://business.nasdaq.com/intel/GIS

/Market-Data-Equities.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2018).
146. See Cboe U.S. Equities, CBOE, https://markets.cboe.com/us/equities/overview
(last visited Dec. 30, 2018).
147. See Last Trading Day, IEX TRADING GROUP (Oct. 18, 2018), https://iextrading
.com/stats/; John McCrank, Chicago Stock Exchange Says Seeking New Potential Buyers, REUTERS
(Mar. 6, 2018, 11:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicagostocexchange-m-a/chi
cago-stock-exchange-says-seeking-new-potential-buyers-idUSKCN1GI2I0.
148. See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure 6, Exchange Act Release No. 3461358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3593, 3595 (Jan. 21, 2010).
149. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 614.
150. COWEN ATM, supra note 2; data from BATS Market Data.
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Market Share
Exchange

Market Share

Off-Exchange

36.8%

Nasdaq

14.0%

NYSE

13.3%

NYSE Arca

10.7%

EDGX

7.2%

BATS-Z

6.5%

BATS-Y

4.3%

Off-Exchange

Nasdaq

EDGA

2.6%

NYSE

NYSE Arca

Nasdaq BX

2.4%

EDGX

BATS-Z

Nasdaq PSX

1.0%

BATS-Y

EDGA

IEX

0.5%

Nasdaq BX

Nasdaq PSX

CHX

0.4%

IEX

CHX

NYSE Mkt

0.2%

NYSE Mkt

NSX

NSX

0.0%

As of 2016, the fragmentation among venues is fairly even,
with the NASDAQ having the single-greatest volume of 14.0%.
When the exchanges are grouped together by ownership, no single
group possesses more than a quarter of the total market: the four
exchanges owned by the NYSE group have 24.2%, the NASDAQ
group has 17.4%, and the Cboe group has 20.6%. Although there is
significant fragmentation among the thirteen venues, and far more
alternative venues, the degree of concentration at the group level in
the lit markets is suggestive of oligopoly.
3. The response of the exchanges
The review presented above indicates that on the level of the
trading system as a whole, the pressures toward fragmentation are
counteracting the inherent network effect of exchange trading.
Regulation NMS has only been in force for a decade, and it must be
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remembered that this is a very short period of time in the entire
sweep of the economic history of the United States—the NYSE, for
example, traces back to the Buttonwood Agreement of 1792.151 In
addition, the past twenty years have been ones of rapid and
ongoing technological change, so it is too early to predict which
forces will ultimately prevail. With the advent of Regulation NMS,
the exchanges are locked in a fierce battle for market share and,
ultimately, survival. In order to meet their primary objective of
attracting liquidity, they offer not only rebates for liquidity
“makers” but other enticements as well. And to make up for lost
revenue from trading, they have raised fees for their proprietary
data feeds. The intense debate surrounding both the various means
of enticing traders—particularly the high-volume, high-frequency
ones—to their exchanges, as well as increasing market data fees,
suggests that the forces that have disciplined MSPs in other
industries have not been operative on the exchanges. The reasons
why this may be so highlight the nature of exchange trading as a
natural monopoly and the effects of knitting together a collection of
competing MSPs into a single, linked trading system.
From the point of view of the exchanges, in the past decade
they have been cast into a fight for their very survival.152 The charts
above indicate the rapid decline in market share of the NYSE since
2005, which had long held a de facto monopoly position in trading
of NYSE-listed securities.153 Not only were the major investment
banks setting up dark pools as alternative venues for institutional
traders who previously relied on the “upstairs market” at the NYSE
for block trades, broker-dealers began to execute trades internally.
The exchanges responded to the competition in a variety of ways.

151. See Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791–1860, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 113, 115 (1998).
152. See Brummer, supra note 7, at 1007; Fleckner, supra note 68, at 2574; see also Amir N.
Licht, Stock Exchange Mobility, Unilateral Recognition, and the Privatization of Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 583 (2001) (exploring competitive pressures on exchanges in the preRegulation NMS environment).
153. The NYSE maintained its monopoly position in the trading of NYSE-listed
securities in part through the operation of NYSE Rule 390, which prohibited “off-board”
trading by NYSE members of NYSE securities. See Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the
Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 838–40 (2001).
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a. Maker-taker pricing. In the competition for order flow, they
followed the early ECNs and adopted “maker-taker” pricing.154
While recently the subject of significant controversy,155 maker-taker
pricing was pioneered in the 1990s by Island, an early ECN.156 It
involves the exchange issuing a rebate to a trader posting a quote,
the maker of liquidity, that is then hit by another trader, the taker,
who buys or sells at the posted price.157 Maker-taker fees are calculated off of the fee permitted under the Access Rule of Regulation
NMS, Rule 610,158 which allows exchanges to charge a fee to traders
of up to 0.30¢ per share, or 30¢ per 100 shares. If an exchange
charges a 0.30¢ fee, a typical rebate paid to the maker of liquidity
would be 0.25¢. This means that the taker of liquidity will pay 0.30¢
for the trade, the maker of liquidity will receive a rebate 0.25¢, and
the exchange will pocket the difference of 0.05¢.
Maker-taker pricing has a number of effects on securities
markets.159 Most importantly, it can incentivize brokers to route
customer orders to the exchanges paying the best rebates, arguably
causing them to violate their duty of best execution.160 It also
distorts prices, thereby reducing transparency in the markets, as it
creates a discrepancy between the posted price of a stock and the

154. See generally Larry Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing Effects on Market Quotations
(Nov. 14, 2013) (working paper) (on file with USC Marshall School of Business).
155. See, e.g., Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S.
Stock Markets: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 7–9 (2014) (statement of Robert Battalio, Professor
of Finance, University of Notre Dame); Curt Bradbury & Kenneth E. Bentsen Jr., How to Improve
Market Structure, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014, 7:03 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014
/07/14/how-to-improve-market-structure/; Jonathan Macey & David Swensen, Opinion,
Wall Street Profits by Putting Investors in the Slow Lane, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/opinion/wall-street-brokers-rebates-kickbacks.html; see also
Stanislav Dolgopolov, The Maker-Taker Pricing Model and Its Impact on the Securities Market
Structure: A Can of Worms for Securities Fraud?, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231 (2014).
156. See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 157–60.
157. See Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing, supra note 154, at 2.
158. 17 C.F.R. § 242.610 (2018).
159. See Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing, supra note 154; Haim Bodek & Stanislav Dolgopolov, Deconstructing Maker-Taker, Part 1: A Gordian Knot for Market Structure?, TABBFORUM
(June 30, 2014), https://tabbforum.com/opinions/deconstructing-maker-taker-part-1-a-gor
dian-knot-for-market-structure.
160. See Robert Battalio, Shane A. Corwin & Robert Jennings, Can Brokers Have It All?
On the Relation Between Make-Take Fees and Limit Order Execution Quality, 71 J. FIN. 2193,
2197 (2016).
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real price received by the seller.161 And it is deeply implicated in the
development of HFT generally and the special order types it uses.162
Nevertheless, it is most obviously a way to attract liquidity by
offering a discount to traders bringing liquidity to an exchange or
other venue. It therefore reflects Rochet and Tirole’s insight that the
volume of transactions carried out on an MSP is sensitive to the
allocation of trading costs between the parties interacting there.163
Similar to a website that offers news content for free to readers
while charging advertisers a fee, maker-taker pricing is an acknowledgement of both the value of liquidity suppliers and that liquidity
takers will pay to access that resource. This is not to deny that
rebates to makers can have deleterious second-order effects, as
Jonathan Macey and David Swensen, Haim Bodek and Stanislav
Dolgopolov, and others point out.164 Rebates can tempt brokers to
violate their duty of best execution, as well as distort the efficiency
of the stock market by causing the price in a quote to deviate from
the true price paid to the seller. Nevertheless, maker-taker pricing
fundamentally appears to reflect the fact that the greatest value of
transactions on an exchange will occur when parties on one side of
the platform, the suppliers of liquidity, are charged less than those
on the other side for transacting on the exchange.165

161. See Harris, Maker-Taker Pricing, supra note 154, at 3 (explaining that maker-taker
creates a transparency problem by causing net spreads to diverge from quoted spreads). But
see Yong Chao, Chen Yao & Mao Ye, Tick Size Constraints, Two-Sided Markets, and Competition Between Stock Exchanges 35 (2015) (working paper), https://www.sec.gov/comments
/265-29/26529-37.pdf (explaining that by reducing the effective tick (real pricing), makertaker reduces frictions).
162. See Maureen O’Hara, High Frequency Market Microstructure, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 257,
262 (2015).
163. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. Despite the intuitive nature of the
connection between maker-taker pricing and Rochet & Tirole’s insights on MSP pricing, it is
not widely discussed in the market microstructure literature. But see Evans, Antitrust Issues,
supra note 91, at 293–94; Levin, supra note 93, at 6; Chester Spatt, The New Realities of Market
Structure and Liquidity: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going? 9–10 (May 3, 2016)
(presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2016 Financial Markets Conference, “Getting a Grip on Liquidity: Markets, Institutions, and Central Banks”).
164. See supra notes 155, 159.
165. An interesting variation is the “inverted exchange,” where liquidity takers (not
makers) are paid a rebate. Inverted exchanges are attractive to brokers handling trades for
institutional or retail investors using market orders. Currently, the NASDAQ BX, BYX,
EDGA, and NYSE National exchanges offer taker-maker pricing. See Alexander Osipovich,
‘Inverted’ Model Said to Be Considered for NYSE’s Newest Exchange, W ALL STREET J. (Feb. 28,
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b. Special order types, co-location, and enriched data feeds. In addition to maker-taker pricing, the exchanges have developed a
variety of other features to lure traders to their venues, including
special order types, flash orders, and co-location. All of these are
typically used by high-frequency traders in conjunction with
proprietary data feeds offering a greater depth of information than
the SIP provides. In the new world of trading, high-frequency
traders have become the exchanges’ best customers, responsible for
over half of trading volume in 2016.166 In order to attract them,
exchanges developed special order types that facilitated their
trading techniques. These orders went far beyond the basic market
orders and limit orders and were designed, allegedly in conjunction
with the HFT shops, to allow HFT firms to take advantage of the
particular conditions and regulatory restraints governing exchange
trading.167 A well-known example is the Hide Not Slide order
developed by the Direct Edge exchanges, EDGA and EDGX.
Rule 610(d) of Regulation NMS prohibits an exchange posting an
order that “locks” or “crosses” a quote on another exchange.168 This
means that if one exchange currently displays the national best bid
(a buy order) in a stock of $12.60, another exchange cannot post an
offer (a sell order) at the same price. Such an order would “lock”
the market, representing a fundamentally irrational state of affairs:
a trader posting that order should immediately hit the previously
posted bid. Similarly, a sell order of $12.59 would “cross” the market and represents an even more irrational state of affairs. In order
to prevent such situations, Rule 610(d) prohibits “locks and
crosses.” (Note however that maker-taker pricing incentivizes
posting a locked or crossed order due to the desire to avoid paying
an access fee and to receive a rebate.169) The Hide Not Slide order
2017, 5:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inverted-model-said-to-be-considered-for
-nyses-newest-exchange-1488277981.
166. See RENA S. MILLER & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44443, HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING: OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2016) (stating in 2016 that HFT
accounted for “roughly 55% of trading volume in U.S. equity markets”).
167. See generally Stanislav Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order Types, and the
Evolution of the Securities Market Structure: One Whistleblower’s Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 2014 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 145, 147–54 (2014).
168. 17 C.F.R. § 242.610(d) (2018) (prohibiting “[l]ocking or crossing quotations”).
169. See Ivy Schmerken, Nasdaq’s Battle over Locked Crossed Markets, INFORMATIONWEEK
WALLSTREET & TECH. (Apr. 15, 2003, 12:22 PM), http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/exchanges
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was formulated to put its user at the head of the line once the
market moved.170 Because it allowed its user to be first in line once
the market unlocked, or uncrossed, it was seen as facilitating
queue-jumping on the part of HFT. In addition to complaining
about its fundamental mechanics, critics such as Haim Bodek
complained that the exchanges hid the details of their operation
from slower, institutional traders.171 Indeed, Direct Edge, by then
acquired by BATS, was fined by the SEC for improper disclosure of
its Hide Not Slide order in 2015, substantiating Bodek’s claims.172
Other means used by the exchanges to attract order flow from
high-frequency traders include offering “flash orders” to traders,173
which allow high-frequency traders to trade on incoming quotes
before they are transmitted to the SIP, and co-location services and
enriched data feeds.174 While much more could be said about all of
these developments, they have given rise to considerable controversy. From the point of view of the exchanges, they are merely
offering a service open to all who are willing to pay for it, and it has
long been considered acceptable for businesses to offer in-depth or
enhanced information to customers willing to pay for it. On the
other hand, the cumulative effect of these services offered to highfrequency traders is to create a two-tiered marketplace.175 In the
fight for market share, the exchanges appear to have colluded with

/nasdaqandrsquos-battle-over-locked-crossed-markets/d/d-id/1255842.html (exploring the
interaction of liquidity rebates and locked and crossed markets).
170. See Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, For Superfast Stock Traders, a Way to Jump
Ahead in Line, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 19, 2012, 5:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10
000872396390443989204577599243693561670.
171. See, e.g., Haim Bodek, HFT Checkmate—The Alpha in Order Types, TABBFORUM
(Dec. 31, 2013), https://tabbforum.com/opinions/hft-checkmate-the-alpha-in-an-order-type.
172. See Hope, supra note 73; cf. Matt Levine, ‘Hide Not Slide’ Orders Were Slippery and
Hidden, BLOOMBERG: OPINION (Jan. 12, 2015, 5:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion
/articles/2015-01-13/hide-not-slide-orders-were-slippery-and-hidden.
173. See Lawrence E. Harris & Ethan Namvar, The Economics of Flash Orders and Trading,
14 J. INV. MGMT. 74 (2016).
174. See Jacob Adrian, Informational Inequality: How High Frequency Traders Use Premier
Access to Information to Prey on Institutional Investors, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 256, 266–
68 (2016).
175. See Steven McNamara, The Law and Ethics of High-Frequency Trading, 17 MINN. J. L.
SCI. & TECH. 71, 113–14 (2016).
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their best customers to allow them to profit at the expense of their
slower, less important ones.176
It is interesting to compare the practices of high-frequency
traders and the stock exchanges with the MSPs discussed by David
Evans in “Governing Bad Behavior By Users of Multi-sided
Platforms.”177 Evans shows that, in general, MSPs will act to maximize the value of their platform (and by extension, the profits of the
platform itself) by developing governance mechanisms that reduce
harmful behavior on the part of participants. An example of this
would be the governance of trading practices at the London Stock
Exchange in the 1700s through the 1900s.178 If unchecked, market
manipulation and insider trading would lead to distrust of the exchange and a reluctance of investors to trade there, so the exchange
itself prohibited such conduct. The main mechanism available to a
platform to police members who engage in manipulative or abusive
activity is to exclude them—the “Bouncer’s Right.”179
Query however whether the exchanges are currently incentivized to exclude traders who create negative externalities for
others, particularly if those traders are responsible for a large
fraction of the total trading volume. The exchanges, in an intense
competition for order flow, lack the real ability to exclude traders,
particularly their most active ones. Furthermore, they are tempted
to work with those more active and very sophisticated traders in
profiting from the less agile order flow of institutional traders, in
effect taking a cut of the profits gleaned from HFT activity. This is
most obvious with the increasing fees charged for co-location, but
many practices of the exchanges arguably amount to taking a cut of
the profits HFT makes off of slower traders.
It is also interesting to reflect on the role of Regulation NMS
here. The operation of the Order Protection Rule, which mandates
176. See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 204–05 (“High-speed firms worked hand in
hand with the trading networks to create exotic order types that would behave in very
specific ways.”); LEWIS, supra note 21, at 163 (“By giving HFT what it wanted (speed, in
relation to the rest of the market; complexity only HFT understood; and payment to brokers
for their customers’ orders, so that HFT had something to trade against), the new stock
exchanges had stolen market share from the old stock exchanges.”).
177. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69.
178. See id. at 1232–35.
179. See id. at 1221 (citing Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights
to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1835 (2006)).
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routing an order to the exchange currently posting the NBBO,
appears to interfere with the natural operation of the liquidity
network effect, which would otherwise lead to the concentration of
trading on one venue or a small number of venues.180 With less
competitive pressure on the exchanges, the ability to exclude would
likely be much greater, as the examples Evans provides suggest.181
The London Stock Exchange was to some extent a monopoly MSP
in its market,182 and to some degree Facebook (for social media) and
Google (online search) are as well. One of the drawbacks of
Regulation NMS then is that it appears to cut against the incentives
the stock exchanges have traditionally had to police the conduct of
those trading on them. By knitting together the various exchanges
in a single, competitive system, Regulation NMS appears to have
incentivized bad behavior on the part of the exchanges themselves,
albeit in a competition in which their very existence is at stake.
c. Rising data fees and the NetCoalition litigation. The phenomena
reviewed so far involve exchanges competing with one another for
order flow, that is, market share in their core business of facilitating
transactions. While transaction revenue has been under pressure
for decades, revenue from the sale of market data has filled the gap,
accounting for an increasing share of exchange revenue in
recent years183:

180. See generally Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the
Georgetown University Center for Financial Markets and Policy Conference on Financial
Markets Quality (Sept. 16, 2014); Spatt, supra note 163.
181. See Evans, Governing Bad Behavior, supra note 69, at 1226–40.
182. See R.C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange and the British Securities Market, 1850–
1914, 38 ECON. HIST. REV. 61, 75 (1985).
183. See SEC Review Threatens Growth of Exchanges’ Lucrative Market Data Fees, S&P
GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 7, 2016, 9:45 AM), https://www.spglobal.com/market
intelligence/en/news-insights/research/sec-review-threatens-growth-of-exchanges-lucra
tive-market-data-fees (data source: SNL Financial).
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PERCENTAGE OF EXCHANGE
REVENUE
FROM MARKET DATA 2011-2016
Transaction Fees

2
9

10
32

89
59

ICE 2011

ICE 2016

Data Services Fees

14
11

74

NASDAQ
2011

24
15
61

NASDAQ
2016

Other Revenue

19
6

20
8

75

72

BATS 2011 BATS 2016

The steady increase in revenue from information services,
amounting to approximately 62% growth over the past five years,184
has prompted criticism that the exchanges are effectively acting as
a monopoly, or more accurately, oligopoly, supplier of trading
data.185 In earlier decades, of course, the NYSE was a de facto
monopoly, and its members profited from both high commissions
and wide spreads on stock trades.186 In the current environment,
traders and other parties who use the proprietary data sold by the
exchanges again charge that the exchanges are acting in a
monopolistic fashion, this time by exploiting their market power to
184. See Robin Wigglesworth, Nicole Bullock & Gregory Meyer, Costly Data Battle Heats
Up Between Traders and Equity Exchanges, FIN. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com
/content/785092ec-33d8-11e6-ad39-3fee5ffe5b5b.
185. See, e.g., HEALTHY MKTS. ASS’N, U.S. EQUITY MARKET DATA: HOW CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST OVERWHELM AN OUTDATED REGULATORY MODEL AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS (Nov.
2017); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS 63 (Oct. 2017); Dave Michaels, Traders Want to Know What
Exchanges Earn from Market Data, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 6, 2017, 6:20 PM), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/traders-want-to-know-what-exchanges-earn-from-market-data-1512592201;
Larry Tabb, Fight over Market Data Fees Is Going to Get Ugly, TABBFORUM (Dec. 28, 2016),
https://tabbforum.com/opinions/fight-over-market-data-fees-is-going-to-get-ugly.
186. See McNamara, supra note 175, at 78–81.
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charge unjustified rates to traders who need this data to compete or
even to comply with a broker’s duty of best execution. The debate
over market data fees is intense and ongoing, with an important
2016 SEC decision in the long-running NetCoalition (now SIFMA)
litigation currently on appeal.187 It also raises the question of
whether the exchanges, which are knit together into a single, virtual
marketplace through the national market system, in fact constitute
a sort of super-MSP. While the exchanges compete vigorously for
market share, they do appear to be acting in concert in gradually
raising their market data fees.188
The market data litigation began in response to the SEC’s 2006
order approving the imposition of fees by NYSE Arca for its
“ArcaBook” data, which provides traders with complete information concerning the depth of liquidity in a stock.189 The petitioner,
NetCoalition, was a group of twenty internet companies and
SIFMA, which represented over 600 trading firms.190 NetCoalition
argued that the SEC erred in approving the fees, because they
violated Regulation NMS Rule 603(a)’s requirement that prices for
“non-core” data be both “fair and reasonable” and “not unfairly
discriminatory.”191 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

187. See NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
188. While not at issue in the Netcoalition litigation, the gradual rise in prices first by

one exchange and then others is suggestive of “tacit collusion” or “conscious parallelism.”
While “[c]ircumstantial evidence can establish an antitrust conspiracy,” purely tacit
collusion is not actionable under current U.S. antitrust law. In re Text Messaging Antitrust
Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630
F.3d, 622, 627–29 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Edward J. Green, Robert C. Marshall & Leslie M.
Marx, Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 464 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).
189. Order Setting Aside Action by Delegated Authority and Approving Proposed
Rule Change Relating to NYSE Arca Data, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59039, 73 Fed. Reg.
74,770–01 (Dec. 9, 2008).
190. See NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 527.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 242.603(a) (2018). “Core data” is required to be reported to the SIP by
the exchanges, and consists of
(1) last sale reports, which include the price at which the latest sale of the security
occurred, the size of the sale and the exchange where it took place;
(2) the current highest bid and lowest offer for the security, along with the number
of shares available at those prices, at each exchange; and
(3) the ‘national best bid and offer,’ or NBBO, which are the highest bid and lowest
offer currently available in the country and the exchange(s) where those prices
are available.
NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 529.
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rejected NetCoalition’s argument that the SEC should use a “costbased approach” and not a “market-based approach” but agreed
with the Petitioner that the SEC had not presented evidence sufficient to justify the fee imposition. The court also stated that it did
not mean that “a cost analysis is irrelevant. On the contrary, in a
competitive market, the price of a product is supposed to approach
its marginal cost,” and “[s]upracompetitive pricing may be evidence of ‘monopoly,’ or ‘market,’ power.”192 The court found that
even though a market-based approach is sufficient, the SEC failed
to “require NYSE Arca to substantiate its market data costs.”193
General statements that order flow competition was “fierce”194
failed to justify “the SEC’s conclusion that order flow competition
constrains market data prices.”195 The court also found that the SEC
had lacked sufficient evidence to conclude that purchasers would
substitute another product for the NYSE Arca depth-of-book
offering “instead of paying a supracompetitive price.”196 The order
was thus vacated and remanded to the SEC for further proceedings.
After the D.C. Circuit determined in 2013 that it lacked
jurisdiction over the case due to the new section 19(b)(3)(C) of the
Exchange Act, the case was returned to the SEC, where it was
assigned to Chief Administrative Law Judge Brenda Murray.197 As
directed by the D.C. Circuit, Judge Murray focused on evidence
that competition constrains the pricing of non-core market data by
the exchanges. Expert witness testimony established that of 350,000
professional subscribers to NASDAQ’s data services, 30,000 of

“Non-core data” is all other data generated by the exchanges, and most importantly includes
quotes deeper in the order book, allowing a trader to see all shares available at an exchange.
Id. at 529–30; see also Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,567 (June 29, 2005).
192. NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 537 (citing Tejas Power Corp. v. FERC, 908 F.2d 998, 1004
(D.C. Cir. 1990)).
193. Id. at 538.
194. Id. at 539.
195. Id. at 541.
196. Id. at 544.
197. Exchange Act section 19(b)(C)(3) was amended by section 916 of The Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010, entitled “Streamlining of filing procedures for self-regulatory organizations.” It
allows changes to rules setting fees to take effect immediately upon filing with the SEC, and
removes the ability of the SEC to “abrogate” a rule change within sixty days of filing with
the SEC. Such a change effectively shifts the burden of any decision as to the validity of an
SRO rule change from the SRO to the SEC. See Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No.
34-63723, 76 Fed. Reg. 4066 (Jan. 24, 2011).
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them purchased the most comprehensive “Total View” service.198
Furthermore, of these 30,000 subscriptions, 5000 were for servers
operated by an estimated 100 HFT firms. These firms were responsible for approximately 90% of trading on NASDAQ.199 Because the
total amount of trading is concentrated in a relatively small number
of firms, these firms allegedly held “the upper hand” in negotiations with NASDAQ. While the exchanges’ expert witnesses conceded that HFT firms would require data feeds from all exchanges,
Judge Murray found that for the vast majority of exchange
customers, one exchange’s non-core data was a substitute for
another’s.200 This conclusion is supported by the fact that trading in
most stocks is dispersed across a number of exchanges, not
concentrated on one.201 Judge Murray also noted that there was
substantial evidence that the exchanges considered competitive
pressure and pushback from clients when considering rate increases.202 There was also evidence that one trader diverted order
flow from NASDAQ in response to a rate increase in 2012.203
A number of points are important to note. First, SIFMA expert
witness David Evans relied on the concept of an MSP to argue that
the exchanges cross-subsidize their highly competitive transaction
businesses by charging high prices for market data, where demand
is more inelastic.204 NYSE expert witness Terrence Hendershott
conceded that the exchanges are “multi-product” firms but resisted
their characterization as MSPs. This is likely because the MSP
literature indicates that it is natural for one side to be charged a
higher price, whereas the thrust of the Defendants’ argument was
that competition for order flow, in fact, constrains market data
pricing.205 Second, Judge Murray lumps together high-frequency
traders with all other traders when considering the entire class of
data customers, yet focuses on them in isolation in order to

198. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Release No. 1015, 114 SEC Docket 1388, at 12
(ALJ June 1, 2016) (initial decision).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 33.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 34.
203. See id. at 37–38.
204. See id. at 24–25.
205. See id. at 17.
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demonstrate the power they have over the exchanges. Certainly for
the HFT firms depth-of-book data from every exchange is not
optional, so for their most important traders, one exchange’s
offering is decidedly not a substitute for another’s.206 While Judge
Murray concedes this point, because HFT firms are by far the
exchanges’ most important customers, it is in considerable tension
with the insistence on the substitutability of depth-of-book from the
various exchanges.207 Third, Judge Murray rejects the notion that a
statistical or econometric review of pricing data is necessary here:
“Statistical evidence is not required to resolve every dispute.”208
Although the exchanges were only able to point to one instance of
a trader diverting order flow from NASDAQ in response to a price
increase, evidence that the exchanges devoted sufficient resources
to marketing their data offerings and to considering customer
reaction to fee increases suffices to show that “depth-of-book prices
are constrained by order flow competition.”209 Nor are estimated
profit margins of 70–85% on data products determinative, despite
the statement of the D.C. Circuit that “in a competitive market, the
price of a product is supposed to approach its marginal cost.”210
Even conceding accounting questions as to true marginal cost, such
margins seem high. Finally, Judge Murray seems out of touch with
HFT practice when she determines that because “nearly 97% of all
trades occur at or within the NBBO . . . most customers do not
require any sort of depth-of-book data.”211 While a trade may occur
206. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 185, at 63 (“[T]he market for proprietary data feeds is not fully competitive. For use in making routing and trading decisions
for active or institutional size order flow, data from one exchange’s feed cannot substitute
for data from another exchange’s feed.”).
207. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Release No. 1015, 114 SEC Docket 1388, at 36
(ALJ June 1, 2016) (initial decision). Judge Murray acknowledges that high-frequency traders
may require depth-of-book data from all exchanges, but she emphasizes that such traders
“reflect only a small percentage of all market participants.” Id.; cf. NetCoalition v. SEC, 615
F.3d 525, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (pointing out the tension between the SEC’s belief that the
exchanges face significant competitive pressures in selling their market data and its
insistence that “depth-of-book data is simply not very important to most traders, even
professionals.”).
208. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n Release No. 1015, 114 SEC Docket 1388, at 42 (ALJ
June 1, 2016) (initial decision).
209. Id.
210. NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 537.
211. Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Release No. 1015, 114 SEC Docket 1388, at 36 (ALJ
June 1, 2016) (initial decision). This determination relies on expert witness Terrence
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within the parameters of the NBBO, that does not mean that depthof-book data was not instrumental in determining whether or not
it was a good bet.212 Indeed, if 90% of trades on NASDAQ are conducted by HFT shops, which use depth-of-book data intensively,
one suspects that more than a mere 3% of trades rely on such data.
The decision may result in another appeal to the federal courts.213
Given the amount of revenue and the intrinsic importance of the
issues at stake, the outcome will be closely watched.
This review of the economics of exchange trading illustrates the
dual nature of the current national market system.214 In the main,
the exchanges function as a linked network of competing MSPs.
Regulation NMS breaks the natural operation of the network effect
of an individual exchange as an MSP, contributing to the existence
and survival of multiple exchanges. The resulting competition is
fierce, leading to conduct on the part of the exchanges that has on
occasion amounted to offering up their less-savvy customers to
their savvier and best ones, the HFT shops. On the other hand,
insofar as the exchanges have market power in their pricing of data,
Hendershott’s testimony that most traders do not need depth-of-book data: “Hendershott
again cited the fact that 96.7% of trades occur at the NBBO prices that are provided by core
data.” Id. at 18.
212. Expert witness Hendershott “conceded that depth-of-book data may be useful to
certain market participants, such as high-frequency traders or traders who rely on
algorithmic computer models.” Id. For discussion of this usefulness, see Jonathan Brogaard,
Terrence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, High-Frequency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REV.
FIN. STUD. 2267, 2300 (2014) (“The results show that HFTs’ order flow is correlated with
information embedded in the limit order book.”).
213. Judge Murray affirmed her 2016 decision on Dec. 21, 2017. See Sec. Indus. & Fin.
Mkts. Ass’n, Release No. 5414, File No. 3-15350 (ALJ Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.sec
.gov/alj/aljorders/2017/ap-5414.pdf. As this article was going to press, the SEC reversed
Judge Murray’s decision. The SEC Commissioners found that NASDAQ and NYSE Arca had
not met their burden of proof in demonstrating that the proposed fee increases were fair and
reasonable. See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84423, 2018 WL
5023228, at *3 (Oct. 16, 2018). This decision represents a new and important stage in this very
long-running legal battle. While it does not declare the fee increases unjustified, it does
represent a significant reversal for the exchanges and may portend new regulatory scrutiny
of their data fee businesses. See SEC Issues Landmark Order Rejecting Nasdaq and NYSE Arca
Market Data Fee Increases, SIDLEY UPDATES (OCT. 29, 2018), https://www.sidley.com
/en/insights/newsupdates/2018/10/sec-issues-landmark-order-rejecting-nasdaq-and-ny
se-arca-market-data-fee-increases.
214. O’Hara and Ye capture this dual nature with their observation that “while U.S.
equity markets are spatially fragmented, they are, in fact, virtually consolidated into a single
market with many points of entry.” Maureen O’Hara & Mao Ye, Is Market Fragmentation
Harming Market Quality?, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 459, 460–61 (2011).
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and to the extent they exercise it in tacit agreement with one
another, the system as a whole has the loose character of an
oligopoly and thus a sort of super-MSP.
III. THE STOCK EXCHANGE AS
VIRTUAL CENTRAL LIMIT ORDER BOOK
Given the nature of the stock exchange as a digital MSP, what
might the stock exchange of the future look like? Perhaps more
speculatively, what should it look like? In recent years, a multitude
of reforms have been proposed, including batched auctions,215
banning maker-taker payments,216 curbing high rates of order
cancellation,217 subjecting high-frequency traders to broker-dealer
regulation,218 and even banning high-frequency trading altogether.219 Some of these reforms might be beneficial, while others
would seem to be mere band-aids. The notion of banning HFT
altogether is nonsensical—HFT is not one thing, but many, and
putting the information technology genie back in the bottle is as
implausible in the financial markets as it would be anywhere else.
Since the fragmentation of the current system gives rise to the
bulk of the problems of the current market, and the stock exchange
as digital MSP carries with it a strong tendency toward centralization, consideration of a market structure offering a controlled
return to centralization is useful at this point. In fact, the not-toodistant history of regulatory reform provides a blueprint for how
such a centralization might be achieved: through the implementation of a central limit order book or “CLOB.” Part III sketches a
virtual CLOB and discusses a number of specific problems it would
either solve or mitigate.

215. See Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading Arms
Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. ECON. 1547 (2015).
216. See Macey & Swensen, supra note 155.
217. See GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43608, HIGHFREQUENCY TRADING: BACKGROUND , CONCERNS, AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS (2014).
218. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Address at the Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P.
Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference: Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure (June
5, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch060514mjw.
219. See Michael Shields, ECB’s Nowotny Calls for High-Frequency Trade Ban, REUTERS
BUS. NEWS (Sept. 13, 2012, 6:52 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-nowotny
-supervision/ecbs-nowotny-calls-for-high-frequency-trade-ban-idUSBRE88C0O020120913.

1022

001.MCNAMARA_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

969

3/4/19 4:30 PM

The Stock Exchange as Multi-sided Platform

A. Regulatory Design
Implementation of a CLOB could take two basic forms. In the
first and simplest, the exchange could exist as a single institution
which would handle all stock trading. An obvious objection is that
the exchange would then have a monopoly position and so be able
to charge monopoly rents for its services.220 A monopoly exchange
would also have little reason to innovate, and as a “single point of
failure” would likely face heightened cybersecurity risks.221 Because of the inherent problems of a monopoly exchange, it is
tempting to look at more nuanced proposals that amount to the
institution of a “virtual CLOB.”
Instead of moving to a single exchange, a central routing service
for orders could be set in place that would function as a virtual
CLOB while allowing the current exchanges to remain in existence.
An expansion of the current Consolidated Quotation System could
accomplish this. Instead of merely collecting the best quotes from
each exchange, and then selecting the best of these to present as the
NBBO, a routing service would collect the entire book of quotes in
each stock from the various exchanges. They would then be
compiled into a national consolidated order book. This systemwide order book would be made available to traders, and all incoming orders would be transacted on the basis of the consolidated
order book. The prices and times as recorded in the consolidated
order book would be the basis for trades; when a preexisting quote
was hit, it would be sent back to the hosting exchange for
processing. A central routing service would therefore function as
the single determinative node in the system, eliminating problems
which arise from fragmentation. Such a proposal would also by
definition do away with the need for the Order Protection Rule.
Since there would be a single, central file of all orders, and all
incoming orders would trade against this one book, it would by
definition provide “depth-of-book” protection for incoming orders

220. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 636–37 (explaining that the mid-twentieth century
dominance of the NYSE allowed it to generate monopoly rents).
221. See Kristin N. Johnson, Cyber Risks: Emerging Risk Management Concerns for
Financial Institutions, 50 GA. L. REV. 131 (2015); Tom C.W. Lin, Compliance, Technology, and
Modern Finance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 159 (2016).
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as well as, of course, top-of-the-book protection.222 This would
mean that protection against trade-throughs would extend to all
quotes, not just the very best quote in the market at the time, as in
the present system.
In addition to depth-of-book protection, a routing service as
virtual CLOB would also enforce strict time priority in the market,
giving it the character of a “hard CLOB.”223 This would be unlike
the current rule, which protects just price priority. Any quote previously entered, therefore, from whatever exchange, at the same
price, would stand ahead in line of later entered quotes at the same
price. In this way a central routing service would implement the
standard rule of price-time priority used at the individual exchanges on the level of the national market system as a whole, something
the current system doesn’t do.224
The basic principles of a virtual CLOB were in fact presented at
various points by the SEC from the early 1970s until the promulgation of Regulation NMS.225 In 1976 the SEC set forth the principles
of a “Composite Central Limit Order Repository” for public comment, and in 1978 it stated its belief that a “central limit order file”
presented the best means to achieve national limit order protection
under the 1975 Amendments. The 1978 Release stated that:
The objectives of a Central File are relatively simple: to make
available a mechanism in which public limit orders can be entered
and queued for execution in accordance with the auction trading
principles of price and time priority and by means of which such
orders can be assured of receiving an execution prior to the
execution of any other order by a broker or dealer in any market
at the same or an inferior price (determining that price by
reference to the price required to be reported in the consolidated

222. See Stoll, supra note 53, at 171–72 (explaining how the Order Protection Rule only
provides top-of-the-book protection).
223. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 644; see also Robert L.D. Colby & Erik R. Sirri,
Consolidation and Competition in the U.S. Equity Markets, 5 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 169, 177–78 (2010).
224. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
225. See Osterle, supra note 35; Junius W. Peake, Entropy and the National Market System,
1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 301 (2006).
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system pursuant to Rule 17a–15, in the event of a completed transaction).226

This proposal was not meant to eliminate the various exchanges, but it would create a central limit order “book” or “file” that
would have the effect of extending both depth-of-book and time
priority to the national system at large.
The proposals in the late 1970s met with vociferous opposition
from the NYSE and other exchanges, which inferred that their
implementation would likely spell the end of trading on the exchange floor.227 As a compromise, the Inter-Market Trading System
or ITS was developed, which allowed for, but did not mandate, the
routing of orders to exchanges displaying better quotes.228 The SEC
floated the idea of a hard CLOB once again in 2000 in its request for
comment on issues relating to market fragmentation, but has not
broached the idea since.229 Most importantly, Regulation NMS pulls
back from implementation of a CLOB. Rule 611 and the other rules
offer a very limited version of a CLOB, with only top-of-the-book
quotations given protection.230
As with the earlier CLOB proposals, an updated proposal
should not abolish the individual exchanges but should instead
develop a routing service on the model of the existing Plans
operating the SIPs. With a virtual CLOB as routing service, now the
entire book of each exchange’s limit offers in a security would be
collated with every other exchange’s book to present a consolidated
limit offer book or file. This book would be available to market
participants, just as each exchange currently offers depth-of-book
information as part of its proprietary information offerings. And
just as with the CTA and CQS Plans, revenue from the sale of this
information would be allocated to the various exchanges. Such a

226. Development of National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-14416, 43
Fed. Reg. 4354, 4359 (Feb. 1, 1978) (footnotes omitted).
227. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 639; Peake, supra note 225, at 308.
228. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 639.
229. See Fragmentation Concept Release, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42450, 65 Fed.
Reg. 10,577 (Feb. 28, 2000).
230. See Stoll, supra note 53; see also Craig Pirrong, SLOB vs. CLOB, STREETWISE
PROFESSOR (Aug. 10, 2013, 1:00 PM), https://streetwiseprofessor.com/slob-vs-clob/ (referring to the current system as a “Simulacrum Limit Order Book”); Roger D. Blanc, Intermarket
Competition and Monopoly Power in the U.S. Stock Markets, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
273, 283 (2006) (calling the Order Protection Rule “Trade-Through Rule Lite”).
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plan would present the same information as the proprietary data
offerings of the exchanges, although the use of this information
would presumably change given the great reduction in fragmentation such a proposal entails. Since the central order book would
be the single book or file used to govern the allocation of all orders
in the system, it would function as the central nervous system of
the entire national market system, with important implications for
the provision of co-location services and proprietary data services,
as discussed below.
While this proposal moves much closer to implementing a
single market for securities, it should be remembered that it does
not mandate the institution of a single exchange. Leaving the current exchanges in existence would preserve competition in the
market for exchange services, helping to avoid the obvious
problems of a single monopoly exchange. The governance of the
routing system would present a primary challenge. Just as with the
CTA and the CQS, any entity providing information to the market
at large has elements of a public utility,231 and complaints have been
raised about the governance of the current plans.232 The SEC should
ensure that a wide variety of interests, including those of non-highfrequency traders such as institutional and retail investors, are
represented there.
B. Problems Solved by a Virtual Central Limit Order Book
The implementation of a CLOB would immediately cause many
of the most important problems since the implementation of
Regulation NMS to vanish. It would also significantly mitigate
others, although it would also create new governance challenges.

231. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 625 (explaining Congress’s understanding in 1975
that an exclusive cross-market information processor is “a public utility” that “should be
regulated accordingly”).
232. See Bradley Hope, Nasdaq Cancels Deal to Operate Data Feed, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 14,
2014, 6:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-to-stop-operating-securities-infor
mation-processor-1389727668; Ivy Schmerken, SIFMA Criticizes SIP Selection Process for Lack
of Transparency, INFORMATIONWEEK WALLSTREET & TECH. (Oct. 17, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://
www.wallstreetandtech.com/data-management/sifma-criticizes-sip-selection-process-for
-lack-of-transparency/d/d-id/1316720.html.
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And by reducing adverse selection risk and giving depth-of-book
protection, dark fragmentation may also decrease as well.233
1. The staleness of the SIP disappears
Along with the implementation of a single routing service
would come a single source of trading information. Since the
information presented by the virtual CLOB would be the single
source of determinative information on stock quotes, there would
be no need for a separate SIP. Currently, there can exist a true
NBBO that is not yet reflected in the NBBO presented by the SIP.234
With a central routing service offering a national order book, the
problem of stale quotes and the NBBO would vanish.
2. Arbitrage due to fragmentation lessens dramatically
Because the time lag between the servers of the various exchanges is meaningful, HFT firms can engage in “latency arbitrage,”
exploiting the timing gaps between the exchanges and the SIP.235
While the profits generated by this activity appear to be in decline, it
is a symbolically important phenomenon that is captured by the
phrase “front-running.” Illegal front-running occurs when a broker
trades ahead of its client’s order, before a price change occurs that
would be caused by that order. Front-running is against both the
rules of the exchanges and the common law applicable to brokerdealers and is a violation of a broker’s fiduciary duty to its client.236
Because an HFT firm almost always trades on a proprietary
basis, not on behalf of a client, a high-frequency trader engages in
“front-running” only in the sense that it discerns market activity
and is able to trade ahead of it. When a trader is not front-running
a client order, such activity is not illegal. Nevertheless, it is
symbolically important.237 The narrative of Flash Boys centers
233.
234.
235.
236.

See Colby & Sirri, supra note 223, at 178.
See Ding et al., supra note 43.
See Fox et al., supra note 29, at 226–42.
Front-running on the part of broker-dealers is illegal under both the common law
and SRO regulations. See Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d,
367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966); FINRA Rule 5270, FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en
/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10860 (last visited Jan. 23, 2019). For a
discussion of the problems HFT poses for insider trading law, see Yadav, supra note 75.
237. See McNamara, supra note 175.
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around such front-running: when protagonist Katsuyama cannot
hit listed quotes because the HFT firms posting them pull them
ahead of his orders, he claims the markets are “rigged.”238 Even
though electronic front-running on the part of high-frequency
traders is legal, it strikes many long-term investors as fundamentally unfair.
By definition, a virtual CLOB would eliminate arbitrage activity
generated by the timing gaps between the exchanges. While it
would not eliminate all arbitrage—think of arbitrage between
market centers in Europe or Asia and those in America, between
commodities and options markets in Chicago and stock exchange
servers in suburban New Jersey, or even between dark pools and a
virtual CLOB—arbitrage solely between different American stock
markets would be eliminated.
3. True “depth-of-book” protection implemented
A limit order book will have all available limit orders in a stock
listed on either side of the NBBO, thereby displaying, in a single
place, all the available shares in a given stock and their various
prices. Generally speaking, as prices fall away from the NBBO there
will be more shares available because, the greater amount a
purchaser will be willing to pay, the more shares it would be
offered, and vice versa. The total number of shares available for
purchase comprises the “depth-of-book” that constitutes the
liquidity in a stock.239 In a CLOB, because all shares are listed on a
single book, a buyer or seller has true depth-of-book protection for
their orders.
In the years preceding the implementation of Regulation NMS,
certain traders and economists advocated for a true depth-of-book
system, whereby the Order Protection Rule would require an
exchange to send orders to any other exchange posting a better
quote, no matter how deep in the order book those quotes were.240

238. See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 40.
239. See Spatt, supra note 163, at 4–5.
240. See, e.g., The Emerging Structure of U.S. Securities Markets and the Appropriate Role for

Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 56–
61 (2000) (statement of Henry M. Paulson, Chairman and CEO, Goldman Sachs & Co.);
Junius W. Peake, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto
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The incumbent exchanges, on the other hand, fought this
proposal vigorously.241
Economically, a true depth-of-book system would represent the
best state of affairs for traders, as it would allow them to access all
available shares at the best prices. A single limit order book by
definition would implement such a system, since all available
orders to buy and sell would be collated into a single list. Not only
would arbitrage between the various exchanges be eliminated but
all orders up and down the book would be present to traders, who
would be assured they would receive all available shares at the best
possible prices.
4. Complex order types reduced (and prohibition on locks and
crosses eliminated)
As the exchanges attempted to cater to their customers in the
past decade, the variety of order types mushroomed.242 Many of
these new order types were designed to allow high-frequency
traders, the exchanges’ best customers, to position themselves
advantageously as prices quickly moved around. The complex
order types therefore came under fire from other traders. At best,
they appeared to add significant complexity to the market microstructure and, at worst, to allow high-frequency traders a way to
cut in line ahead of others.
Traditionally there were two basic order types: the limit order
and the market order. As the national market system was implemented, a number of other order types became common. To name
just a few, these include intermarket sweep orders (“ISOs”), pegged
midpoint orders, flash orders, and orders designed to position
traders at the top of the market when the market “unlocks” or
“uncrosses” such as the notorious Hide Not Slide.243 In order to
prevent the irrational and confusing condition of locked or crossed
markets, Rule 610(d) of Regulation NMS prohibits an exchange

Relating to Enhancements to the Exchange’s Existing Automatic Execution Facility (Sept. 22,
2004), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/nyse200405/jwpeake092204.pdf; Black, supra
note 86.
241. See Oesterle, supra note 35, at 639.
242. See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 167–169 and accompanying text.
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from posting a bid (buy) order at a price higher than the current
best offer (sell order) or an offer at a price lower than the current
best bid.244
In the current race for speed, however, traders often profit from
being first in line when a market unlocks or uncrosses, as they will
then be able to capture a “maker” rebate.245 With the Hide Not Slide
order, a trade could submit an order that would be hidden if it
would lock or cross the market, yet would be placed first in line
when the market changed. While this order allowed an HFT shop
to eke out profits in such conditions, it appeared to critics that the
exchanges were allowing them to “cut in line,” so to speak.246 While
there would likely remain other complex order types, by doing
away with multiple markets, a CLOB would undercut the need for
order types that are predicated on a fragmented marketplace. Since
locks and crosses would not be possible in a single market, the need
for complex order types to negotiate them will disappear, as well
as other orders designed to negotiate between different markets,
such as intermarket sweep orders.
5. Broker-dealer best execution problems diminish
The duty of best execution on the part of stockbrokers serves as
a backstop to the Order Protection Rule. This duty mandates that a
broker send its client’s order to the exchange where it will receive
the “best execution.”247 Note that best execution is not defined
solely in terms of price; speed and the desire to move markets as
little as possible when placing an order are also legitimate
considerations for brokers making routing decisions.
The inducements for order flow from brokers offered by the
exchanges, ATSs, and large broker-dealers running internal
matching engines illustrates the value of these orders. The inducements are primarily maker-taker rebates, but flash orders and other

244.
245.
246.
247.

17 C.F.R. § 242.610(d) (2018) (prohibiting “[l]ocking or crossing quotations”).
See Schmerken, supra note 169.
See Patterson & Strasburg, supra note 170.
See Fragmentation Concept Release, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42450, 65 Fed.
Reg. 10,577, 10,584 (Feb. 28, 2000); see also Polise, supra note 4, at n.207; FINRA Rule 5310,
FINRA, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id
=10455 (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).
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enticements to get high-frequency traders “to play in one
exchange’s sandbox” also play a role.248 While maker-taker rebates
have received criticism for their corrupting influence on stockbrokers, under an economic analysis they would seem to be a
natural consequence of the value of liquidity.249 Maker-taker
rebates should therefore not be seen as an overriding problem with
today’s trading system. Also important are payments to brokers for
order flow by large broker-dealers, such as Charles Schwab or
Citadel, who then settle trades in their internal matching engines.250
In addition to contributing to the movement of orders away from
the lit exchanges to dark venues, academic studies indicate that
such orders frequently do not receive the best price.251 In such
instances, broker-dealers will likely not have met their duty of best
execution. On the other hand, it would seem that disclosure of
maker-taker rebates on the part of brokers to their clients should be
sufficient to deal with any disquiet due to maker-taker rebates, as
these rebates naturally arise given the stock exchange’s character as
an MSP.
Nevertheless, were a virtual CLOB instituted, problems surrounding the broker’s duty of best execution should diminish
considerably. For a start, the routing decision would be reduced to
the primary decision of whether to trade in the lit markets, which
would use a single limit order book, or in a dark pool or other nonexchange venue. Furthermore, by offering strict price and time
protection to all lit orders, a virtual CLOB should be expected to
diminish the incentive to trade off-exchange.252 The simplification
of the markets through a virtual CLOB would greatly reduce the
danger of brokers sending orders to venues where they were at risk
of receiving less than best execution.
6. Complexity due to speed bumps disappears
A virtual CLOB would eliminate the problem of the increasing
complexity of the market system through the implementation of
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 45, at 84.
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
See Fleckner, supra note 68, at 2570.
See, e.g., Battalio et al., supra note 160.
See Colby & Sirri, supra note 223, at 178.

1031

001.MCNAMARA_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/4/19 4:30 PM

2018

“speed bumps” by IEX and other exchanges. In response to the
outcry over HFT front-running, IEX designed a system specifically
designed to protect pegged midpoint orders from exploitation by
high-frequency traders.253 Their system subjects all incoming
orders to a 350-microsecond “speed bump.” When an order enters
the IEX system, it traverses a thirty-eight-mile length of coiled
optical fiber cable that delays the order for 350 microseconds
(millionths of a second). Updates of pricing information from the
other exchanges and the SIP are not however subject to this delay.254
That means that incoming orders receive the benefit of any price
changes occurring in the national market system at large. Most
importantly, this delay prevents high-frequency traders from
reacting to incoming orders before those orders can be filled,
because any HFT order would itself be 350 microseconds behind
the current, true NBBO. This system is meant to allow traders to
operate without the adverse selection risk that trading on the
normal lit exchanges entails.
Before the SEC approved IEX’s application to become a
registered exchange in June 2016,255 the established exchanges and
a few other players, such as Citadel, waged an intense battle to stop
it.256 A key objection was that the speed bump introduced a new
and significant element of complexity into the trading environment.257 By intentionally delaying incoming orders, the argument
went, IEX’s new system makes an already complicated system
more complicated yet, and reduces the reliability of quotes in
general. On legal grounds, the objectors in fact had a plausible
argument that because of the built-in delay in IEX’s system, it
253. See Andrew Upward, IEX: An Intriguing Wrinkle in the National Market System,
WEEDEN & CO. (Mar. 17, 2016), www.weedenco.com/market-intelligence/market-structure.
254. See Investors’ Exchange LLC, Comment Letter Regarding Investor’s Exchange
LLC Form 1 Application (Release No. 34-75925; File No. 10-222) (Nov. 13, 2015), https://
www.sec.gov/comments/10-222/10222-20.pdf.
255. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves IEX Proposal to Launch
National Exchange, Issues Interpretation on Automated Securities Prices (June 17, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-123.html.
256. See Annie Massa, IEX Outduels Citadel, NYSE as ‘Flash Boys’ Exchange Approved,
BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2016), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/O8X
ZWL6JTSKT?bc=W1siU2VhcmNoIFJlc3VsdHMiLCIvcHJvZHVjdC9ibGF3L3NlYXJjaC9yZ.
257. See Dave Michaels, Michaels’s Take: Post-IEX Win, Speed-Bump Fight Goes On, WALL
STREET J. (July 1, 2016, 7:31 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michaelss-take-post-iex
-win-speed-bump-fight-goes-on-1467372715.
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should not qualify as an “automated trading center,” with its
quotes entitled to “protected” status under Rule 611. The objectors
focused on language from the Regulation NMS Adopting Release,
which states that “[t]he term ‘immediate’ precludes any coding of
automated systems or other type of intentional device that would
delay the action taken with respect to a quotation.”258 The SEC,
however, ruled in favor of IEX, determining that the 350 microsecond delay was merely “de minimis.”259 Setting aside the obvious
questions—If the speed bump were de minimis, why would IEX
build an entire business on it? And why such vehement opposition
from the established players?—the SEC stated that the principle of
providing for competition in the exchange space justified the
introduction of this new and complex system. As denouement, the
exchanges revealed that their objections were not in fact based on
any important principle. They have since announced plans to offer
exchanges with speed bumps themselves.260
Whatever the final import of this battle, by doing away with the
opportunity for arbitrage between the various exchanges, a CLOB
would eliminate the need for speed bumps as a defensive mechanism offered by an exchange.
7. Avoidance of piecemeal reforms
A final and not insignificant benefit of the reform proposed here
would be the avoidance of smaller piecemeal reforms. A number of
such reforms have been proposed: An access fee pilot program that
would experiment with smaller fees under Rule 610, thereby lowering the permissible maker-taker rebates;261 batched auctions;262

258. Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,534
(June 29, 2005).
259. Inv’rs Exch., LLC for Registration as a Nat’l Sec. Exch., Exchange Act Release No.
34-78101, 114 SEC Docket 2064, at 77 (June 17, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other
/2016/34-78101.pdf.
260. See John D’Antona Jr., NYSE American Marketplace Launches, TRADERS MAG.
(July 25, 2017), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/ecns_and_exchanges/nyse-ameri
can-marketplace-launches-116480-1.html.
261. See SEC EQUITY MKT. STRUCTURE ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATION FOR AN
ACCESS FEE PILOT (July 8, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/recommendation
-access-fee-pilot.pdf; Missing: The Access Fee Pilot Proposal, THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Nov. 29,
2017), http://blog.themistrading.com/2017/11/missing-the-access-fee-pilot-proposal/.
262. See Budish et al., supra note 215.
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revisiting the SEC’s interpretation of Rule 603(a)(2), which enables
co-location and proprietary data feeds by allowing the exchanges
to transmit data to HFT servers at the same time it is sent to the SIP,
thereby greatly aggravating the problem of the staleness of the
SIP;263 banning maker-taker rebates;264 and subjecting highfrequency traders to broker-dealer regulation,265 among others.
All these reforms would involve considerable regulatory study,
proposals, and public comment, and would each entail secondorder effects as well as significant new complexity in the trading
system and its governing law. Most importantly, they are all
intended to mitigate problems that fundamentally arise from the
current system’s fragmented character. The institution of a virtual
CLOB would eliminate or mitigate many of the most important
problems arising from this fragmentation and do so in a way that
greatly simplifies the national market system.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues for a renewed look at the concept of a CLOB
in light of the dysfunctions of the digital stock markets under
Regulation NMS. Such a market structure would mitigate or eliminate many of the most important recent problems of the exchanges.
It also comports with the economic nature of the stock exchange as
an MSP. Given the investment of the exchanges and other important players in the current fragmented system, the institution of a
CLOB is currently implausible as a matter of political economy.
Nevertheless, this option should be kept in mind in future debate
concerning the organization of the stock markets. Regulation NMS
has only been in force for a decade, but the transformation of
financial markets by digital technology has already put the national
market system under considerable strain. Although the competition Regulation NMS incentivizes has reduced transaction costs
considerably, its fragmented system has given rise to many other
less obvious costs. Most importantly, the rising share of data
revenues generated by the exchanges functions as a sort of tax on
traders, and by extension investors, who are forced to pay for
263. See Direct vs SIP Data Feed, NANEX (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.nanex.net/aqck2
/4599.html; see also Fox et al., supra note 29, at 270–71.
264. See Macey & Swensen, supra note 155.
265. See White, supra note 218.
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enhanced data feeds if they are to remain competitive and meet
their duty of best execution.
It must be remembered that the need for this market information, like many of the more particular problems of fragmentation
reviewed above, is itself a creation of Regulation NMS. While it is
unlikely a CLOB will be instituted anytime soon, the economic and
political events of the past decade caution against investing too
much in the status quo. In a number of other areas of the economy,
citizens, consumers, legislators, and regulators are beginning to
grapple with the implications of dominant MSPs in areas as diverse
as internet search, retail, and social media and news. While the
particular regulatory landscape inhabited by the stock exchanges
differs greatly from these other examples, dominant MSPs pose a
fundamental challenge to the system of American capitalism,
which has relied on a large number of enterprises to generate
broadly distributed benefits from competition. Recognition of the
powerful tendencies toward centralization in the world of digital
capitalism and a willingness to implement governance structures
with a wide variety of inputs may be necessary in the years ahead
to preserve a workable system of capitalism in the digital environment of the future.
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